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While acknowledging that inquiries regarding capacity are sometimes
unavoidable, this Article criticizes our legal system's exclusive reliance on
the competency construct to determine when and how to interfere with in-
dividual choice. It posits that this narrow focus has impeded the develop-
ment of guidelines for interference that are based on a balancing of
legitimate competing individual and social interests. It also argues that
exclusive focus on the competency question has produced an overreliance
on dehumanizing guardianship and conservatorship proceedings and has
retarded the development of more discriminating, less intrusive, and more
helpful mechanisms for dealing with destructive and antisocial choices.
Although this Article suggests improvements to the ABA Model Rules
and substantive law within the competency construct, it also proposes
guidelines for intervention that do not revolve around the competency ques-
tion. This approach, while assigning great weight to the value ofpreserving
individual autonomy, considers other factors including: (1) the extent to
which the choice seriously invades the rights, resources, and welfare of
others; (2) the irreparability of the harm to self and others threatened by
the proposed choice of action; (3) whether those whose interests are
threatened by the proposed action will learn about the threat in time to
take self-protective action; (4) the effect in the aggregate of such individual
choices on the common weal; and, as a countervailing consideration,
(5) how integral the choice in question is to the individual's most intimate
life and values. The Article concludes with a search for solutions that do
not require a finding of client incompetency for their implementation.
INTRODUCTION
W ITH the increasing complexity and interdependence of our society,
the increasing longevity of its members, and the increasing compe-
tition for its ever-scarcer resources (witness the budget deficit crisis at
every level of state and local government), Americans have unspokenly
begun to question a fundamental tenet of Western liberalism with its al-
most religious faith in the beneficence of unfettered individualism. In
keeping with our Western liberal orientation, Americans have tradition-
ally assumed that the greater good is usually best achieved by letting the
1102 [Vol. 62
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individual do what he, as the sole arbiter, believes is in his own selfish
best interests. We have assumed that the common weal will emerge from
this clash of individual selfish decisions.'
But the nation's mood has sobered. Political developments during the
last several years suggest that Americans are dimly entertaining the pos-
sibility that the aggregate of individual decisions is not necessarily for the
general good-that, indeed, individual decisions in the aggregate often
have serious adverse effects on the legitimate interests of others and dev-
astating effects on society as a whole.2 To see this, one need only read
the daily newspapers. The decision whether or not to wear a motorcycle
helmet is no longer left to the individual.3 Individual restaurant owners
can no longer permit patrons to smoke on their premises in many parts of
California.4 Both the recent flooding in the Midwest and the earthquake
in southern California prompted talk to the effect that prospectively the
taxpayer should not be called upon to bail out individuals who decline to
carry disaster insurance.5 Whether individuals will be allowed to buy as
1. Cf Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41
Emory L.J. 467, 471 (1992) ("[L]awyers enhance the rule of law by enhancing the auton-
omy of each individual."); Richard A. Posner, The Theory of Monopoly, reprinted in
Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law 15-19 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing the role of voluntariness in the rational self-interested individual utility
maximization as the underpinnings of an efficient economic system); Charles K. Rowley
& Alan T. Peacock, Welfare Economics: A Liberal Restatement 7-10 (describing the
conditions for welfare economics). But the appropriateness of orthodox welfare eco-
nomic theory in analyzing collective or public decisions has been challenged. See Hal R.
Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness in Philosophy
and Economic Theory (Frank Hahn & Martin Hollis eds., 1979). In assuming the emer-
gence of the common weal, we have tended to ignore the role of power differentials,
which warp this model.
2. Americans may also be experiencing dismay at the neo-individualistic behavior of
special interest groups, but discussion of that phenomenon is beyond the scope of this
Article.
3. See Dan Beyers, Some Easy Riders Resent Md. 's New Helmet Law.. Police to Start
Writing Tickets Today, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1992, at B6 (reporting that 25 states and the
District of Columbia have helmet laws for all riders, another 22 states require younger
riders to wear helmets, and only 3 states-Illinois, Iowa, and Colorado-have no helmet
laws).
4. Julie Tamaki, Smoke Out. Cities Try to Snuff Smokers, L.A. Times, July 21,
1993, at B5 (stating that 56 cities and counties nationally have banned smoking in restau-
rants, 49 of which are in California).
5. See, e.g., William P. Cheshire, Americans Have Forgotten the Lesson of the Three
Little Pigs, Ariz. Republic, Jan. 27, 1994, at B4 ("[S]o few Californians have earthquake
protection that the insurance industry is expected to pay out only about S1 billion in
claims."); Joseph Farah, Contrarian Questions About Post-Quake Aid: Bailouts Remove
the Incentive to Prepare; Americans' Generosity Is Abused When Assisting Victims Is Com-
pulsory Through Taxes, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 31, 1994, at B7 (arguing that when the
federal government assumes the costs of earthquake damages, it removes incentive to
insure property); John McCarron, Next Time, Babe. Get Quake Coverage, Chi. Trib., Jan.
30, 1994, at C3 ("If I have to buy antifreeze and storm windows, why is it that only 25
percent of Californians buy earthquake insurance?"); Marc Sandalow, Capitol Hill Grum-
bling Over Earthquake Aid; Some in Congress Complain Too Few Have Insurance, San
Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1994, at Al ("While most members of Congress have been
far too politic to utter words that could be construed as insensitive to victims .... pri-
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much health care as they want in all situations is one aspect of the cur-
rent debate on the implementation of a national health care system.6
Viewed from this perspective, the problem examined here is but a micro-
cosmic facet of a more fundamental dilemma now confronting society.
How much unfettered individualism can we afford? And when is it ap-
propriate, even essential, to mediate, to regulate, and occasionally to
override individual decisions and activities, even if competently made?
I. THE DILEMMA
This Article addresses the lawyer's dilemma in representing a client
whose expressed wishes regarding resolution of a problematic situation-
indeed, the goals of the representation-are deeply at odds with what the
attorney believes is the morally responsible response to the problem. The
morally perplexing client can be any age and in any state of physical or
mental health.7 This Conference and hence this Article, however, focus
on the elderly, supposedly impaired or questionably competent client.8
This Article is not concerned with individuals who are "unable to enun-
ciate a ... choice"9 after receiving every possible encouragement to do
so. It is concerned with those who make arguably self-destructive or an-
tisocial decisions.10
Discussions in the elderlaw arena tend to approach the lawyer's di-
lemma by asking whether and to what extent the client's competency is
vately there is an undercurrent of frustration that less than one in four people who live in
the earthquake-prone state bother to purchase earthquake insurance."); Protecting Tax-
payers from Disasters, Chi. Trib., Jan. 19, 1994, at N16 ("Though earthquake insurance
... is widely available from private insurers in California, only 25 percent of the state's
residents have it-only 40 percent in this [previous] quake's hard-hit San Fernando Val-
ley."). But see Mary McGrory, We All Should Pay the Price, Ariz. Republic, Jan. 28,
1994, at B7 ("[Miost [Americans] take the 'United' in United States to heart and under-
stand that we are all expensive in one way or another, and that states have their costly
quirks just like people.").
6. See, e.g., Richard D. Lamm, Health-Care Rationing is No Dirty Word, Newsday,
Sept. 30, 1993, at 102 ("How do we buy the most health care for our citizens at a price we
can afford? It will force us to make hard choices we have been unwilling to make to
date.").
7. Professor David Luban's thought-provoking article, Paternalism and the Legal
Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454, 455-57, lists seven hypotheticals posing moral dilem-
mas, none of which involve a mentally incompetent client.
8. I use "supposedly impaired" to reflect my deep skepticism about the usefulness of
the competency concept to resolve these kinds of moral dilemmas.
9. Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of
Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61, 96 (1988). Such individuals may be indecisive, ambiv-
alent, unwilling to take a permanent position between competing family members, or
possibly unable to comprehend the matter. In such cases, barring an emergency, no deci-
sion need be made until the client settles on a position. In emergency situations, it may
become necessary to appoint someone on a very time-limited and task-specific basis to
make a decision for the client. While it may be, as Professor Smith suggests, that the
decision-maker should "make a 'substituted judgment' based upon the client's values,"
id., I am not sure that the agency basis of the attorney-client relationship allows the
lawyer herself to make the decision. See infra notes 134-52 and accompanying text.
10. What constitutes a "choice" could be the subject of extensive debate, but such a
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impaired.11 The question becomes, in the new jargon, whether and to
what extent the client is "disabled,"12 impaired, or incapacitated from
making a particular decision or decisions generally. 3
discussion would extend beyond the primary focus of this Article. A layperson's under-
standing of the word must suffice for now.
This dichotomy between individuals who are and are not able to enunciate a choice
does not take into account persons who make choices that, for financial or other reasons,
cannot be put into effect. Careful counseling can, in many cases, help a client arrive at
more realistic choices. If this does not work, the client is in the same position as any
individual who, competent or not, lacks the means to turn his wishes into reality. The
private and public sector should, of course, do whatever can be done to provide decent
options for all citizens, regardless of economic status.
11. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 74 ("If the client's competence is open to ques-
tion, the attorney should interview and advise the client with the applicable legal stan-
dard in mind."); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515, 533
("Before deciding whether to intervene on behalf of Mr. H or Mr. M, a lawyer would
need to consider the question of their competence, for it is only if they are incompetent
that intervention could possibly be justified.").
Most articles do not discuss why they focus solely on the competency question. Some
treat the competency question as self-evident when discussing incompetency determina-
tions by attorneys, as opposed to judicial adjudications. See, e.g., Mark Falk, Ethical
Considerations in Representing the Elderly, 36 S.D. L. Rev. 54 (1991) (stating how to
substantiate a client's competence to perform a particular act); Marshall B. Kapp, Repre-
senting Older Persons: Ethical Challenges, Fla. B.J., June 1989, at 25, 28 (suggesting that
standards of determining capacity for medical decision making offer a useful model for
determination of capacity for legal decision making); Peter J. Strauss & Nancy N.
Dubler, Ethical Issues in Decision Making, Compleat Law., Fall 1986, at 14, 14 (also
suggesting that lawyers use a standard developed for determining patients' ability to pro-
vide informed consent to medical care). But see Health Care Options for the Elderly:
NCPL Seminar Probes Attorney Dilemma in Determining Competency of Client, Preven-
tive L. Rep., Dec. 1988, at 22, 24 (edited transcript) [hereinafter Health Care Options]
(statement of Dr. Leonard Hellman) ("I can't imagine an attorney, no matter what his
background is, in a legal office trying to determine competence."); Maria M. das Neves,
Note, The Role of Counsel in Guardianship Proceedings of the Elderly, 4 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 855, 862 (1991) (opining that an attorney should not assess the client's abilities at
all, but should instead advocate zealously for the client's wishes).
12. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1992) [hereinafter Model
Rules]. Although the paragraphs within each comment to the Model Rules are not num-
bered, for ease of reference, I refer to each paragraph as if it were so numbered. Thus, for
example, I refer to the fifth paragraph within a comment as Comment 5.
13. To some, the term "competence" has a more global ring than the term "capac-
ity," as the following excerpt discussing the capacity to make health care decisions
indicates:
While used in many contexts, "competence" refers most accurately to a judicial
determination about a person's decision-making ability. Moreover, competence
generally describes a status, the ability to make all or, conversely, no decisions
for oneself. In contrast, "capacity" is a more limited and specific concept; it
refers to a person's ability to make a particular decision as determined by health
care professionals or others.
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Life-Sustaining Treatment: Making
Decisions and Appointing a Health Care Agent 100 (July 1987). See also Lawrence A.
Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, Elderlaw Cases and Materials 789 (1992) (discussing the
terms in the context of guardianship and conservatorship statutes) ("[I]ncapacitated[, as
compared to 'incompetent',] ... is believed to suggest impairment which is limited, rather
than global or complete."); Stephen J. Anderer, Determining Competency in Guardian-
1994] 1105
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Presumably, if the client is fully competent to make the decision in
question and remains adamant even after sensitive client-centered coun-
seling 4 and gentle persuasion,15 the lawyer's only options are to advo-
cate or otherwise comply with that client's expressed wishes, however
repugnant, or to discontinue the representation.' 6 If, on the other hand,
the lawyer finds that the client is disabled from making the kind of deci-
sion(s) required to resolve the problem, the door magically opens to some
form of surrogate or substitute decision-making. For example, according
to American Bar Association Model Rule 1.14(a), as fleshed out by the
comment, if "a client suffers a disability" and "has no guardian or legal
representative, the lawyer often must act as de facto guardian."'" Rule
1.14(b) authorizes a lawyer to "seek the appointment of a guardian or
take other protective action with respect to a client ... when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's
own interest."' 8 "'Reasonably believes' . . . denotes that the lawyer be-
lieves the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the
belief is reasonable."' 9 This standard leaves much room for error. The
phrase "in the client's own interest" is itself ambiguous. Does it refer to
the client's own expressed statement of his20 interest, to the client's "ob-
jective" (according to whom?) "best interests," to what the lawyer be-
lieves to be in the client's "best interests," or to what the lawyer guesses
ship Proceedings 3 (Nancy A. Coleman et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the terms in the
context of guardianship statutes) ("[T]he term incompetent has an all-encompassing con-
notation, while terms such as disabled and incapacitated are more consistent with the
trend toward limited findings of inability in specific areas."). Interestingly, Black's Law
Dictionary makes no distinction between the two terms. See Black's Law Dictionary 986
(6th ed. 1990) (defining mental capacity and mental competence in a single entry); id.
(defining mental incapacity and mental incompetency in a single entry).
14. For a description of what one commentator calls "gradual counseling," or "re-
peatedly refer[ring] to the client's goals and values in assessing each alternative and in
discussing the pros and cons of an alternative," see Smith, supra note 9, at 92-96. See also
infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
15. See Tremblay, supra note 11, at 579 (addressing the role of persuasion in the
attorney-client relationship and suggesting that it is more appropriate "to use persuasive
dialogue with a confused client than with a more coherent client").
16. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.16(b) permits the lawyer to withdraw from
the representation "if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on
the interests of the client .. " Further, the lawyer may withdraw even if there would be
an adverse effect on the client's interest if the "client insists upon pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent ..... Id. Rule 1.16(b)(3) & cmt. 7. If
the lawyer represents the client in litigation, she may need the court's permission before
she may withdraw. Model Rule 1.16(c) makes clear that the lawyer may not ethically
withdraw if the court has ordered her to continue the representation. See id. Rule
1. 16(c). Therefore, under some circumstances, the lawyer may not even have the option
to withdraw.
17. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 2.
18. Id. Rule 1.14(b). For an analysis and critique of Rule 1.14, see infra notes Ill-
249 and accompanying text.
19. Model Rules, supra note 12, Terminology.
20. For convenience, unless the facts require otherwise, I refer to male clients and
female attorneys.
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the client would deem best (based on the client's values and life history)
if the client were fully competent to make the decision in question?
One can see already that all this is very confusing, presenting ample
opportunities for individual lawyer error and paternalism in dealing with
a client's autonomy and liberty interests.2" There are no guidelines re-
garding what standards the already harried lawyer should apply before
seeking guardianship or other protective action. How the lawyer should
go about acting as defacto guardian and what authorizes her to do so is
seemingly anybody's guess. A careful redrafting of the Model Rules to
answer questions like those already raised could reduce some of this con-
fusion, and that may be a good place to start. Ultimately, however, and
for reasons to be discussed anon, I am deeply skeptical about the compe-
tency concept's usefulness as a divining rod for determining whether or
not a client's expressed wishes should be honored.
Three hypotheticals set the stage for this discussion. 22
A. Hypothetical 1
Arnold has sought your services in connection with his dispute with a
mechanic who repaired Arnold's car after Arnold ran it into a ditch on a
private road. The auto mechanic is holding the car until Arnold pays for
his services, but Arnold refuses to pay because he contends the car was
improperly repaired. He wishes to take it to another mechanic.
In the course of the representation, you learn that Arnold, who has a
valid driver's license, has recently started suffering from seizures. In fact,
21. The terms "autonomy" and "liberty" are themselves imprecise. Autonomy and
liberty are not synonymous with doing whatever one wants regardless of the conse-
quences for others. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
110 (1988) ("What makes an individual the particular person he is reflects his pursuit of
autonomy, his construction of meaning in his life"); Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals 59 (K. Beck trans., 1959) (explaining that autonomy is a neces-
sary precondition to morality); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 71-114 (1981)
(connecting autonomy to the essence of being human); John B. Attanasio, The Principle
of Aggregate Autonomy and The Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 Va. L.
Rev. 677, 679 (expressing autonomy as having value because it gives a person dignity).
For an overview of this subject, see Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral
Discourse, 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 231 (1979).
In the field of American medical ethics, patient autonomy has long been the dominant
rhetorical value. See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy
Age, 68 Ind. L.J. 727, 727 (1993). Personal autonomy, however, is sometimes subverted
to the needs of society, as for example, with compulsory vaccination laws. See id. at 728.
It is also sacrificed to other concerns. See id. For example, medical malpractice law
imposes choices upon patients under the rubric of informed consent. See id. at 729. "The
law of tort, not contract, determines the quality of medical care to which a person is
entitled, and a patient may not contract away the right to receive reasonable care." Id.
For further discussion, see infra note 101.
22. These hypotheticals, which are used as a reference for discussion of various points
throughout this Article, present clients who are totally unresponsive to counseling and
persuasion. They represent the extreme rather than the usual case. Most clients, young
or old, can be persuaded to some degree. I use the extreme examples, however, to more
sharply define the issues raised by this Article.
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the ditch incident itself resulted from a seizure. You suggest that Arnold
consult a doctor, pointing out that if he continues to drive without first
finding a way to eliminate his seizures, he risks serious bodily harm or
even death to himself and others, as well as extensive liability for negli-
gence. Arnold angrily tells you to mind your own business. He refuses
to see a doctor, give up his car, or give up driving. After you have en-
gaged in extensive "gradual counseling" 23 and carefully measured per-
suasion, using "is statements" as opposed to "ought statements" or
"outright threats,"' 24 Arnold remains adamant that he will not give up
driving, even temporarily. 25 Arnold lives alone and, to the best of your
knowledge, has no living relatives. Apparently no one else knows about
the seizures.
B. Hypothetical 226
Your client, Martha, bought an over-priced, very poor quality roofing
job, and the roof began leaking soon after the "repairs." Martha un-
knowingly signed a deed to her house to secure an $8000 note to pay for
the roof, believing that it was a contract for the roofing job. A collection
company that buys the roofer's financing notes has sued Martha for the
$8000. You have looked into this scam and have prepared an answer and
counterclaim asserting fraud and seeking a judgment voiding the deed as
well as statutory consumer protection remedies, including treble damages
and attorney's fees.
The deadline for filing the answer is the next day. You stop by
Martha's house to explain it, and you find her confused and in tears. She
says no one loves her and she would be better off in a nursing home.
"I've always paid my bills. If they say I owe this, they must be right or
they would not go to court." Martha wants the debt paid and the lawsuit
ended so no one will think she cheated anyone. She also states that her
health will not survive the stress of litigation. Or suppose the triggering
event is
an eviction notice from a real estate speculator who claims that he now
owns [Martha's] home. [You] recognized the name of the speculator
as an unscrupulous foreclosure sale operator who has obtained fraudu-
lent title to many homes in recent years. The speculator claims title to
23. See Smith, supra note 9, at 92-96. For an explanation of "gradual counseling,"
see also supra note 14.
24. See Tremblay, supra note 11, at 577-79. Perhaps I should have said "after you
have attempted to engage in gradual counseling and measured persuasion" because Ar-
nold may not even let you get that far.
25. This hypothetical was inspired by a friend still grieving over the loss of his step-
daughter who, together with her fiance, was instantly killed when rear-ended at 80 miles
per hour by an elderly woman. This woman had previously caused several accidents
resulting in serious bodily harm but still had a driver's license and a car.
26. The first two paragraphs of this hypothetical are taken almost verbatim from
Frolik & Barnes, supra note 13, at 96 (using a hypothetical proposed by the Center for
Social Gerontology in Ann Arbor, Michigan).
[Vol. 621108
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the house based on a lien contract that may have been forged or
[Martha] may have signed without understanding its nature.27
Martha lives alone and has no relatives. You engage in extensive
"gradual counseling" in which you carefully explore Martha's reasons
for not wishing to file an answer, pointing out to her in a non-threatening
way that she may lose the savings she had counted on to support herself,
and possibly her lifelong home, if she does not file an answer.28 You also
explain that if she loses her home, she may have to rely on supplemental
welfare for her housing and general support and may even become home-
less or institutionalized. After all this, Martha remains adamant that she
does not want you to submit an answer. In view of Martha's modest
financial resources, you cannot spend many billable hours on this case.
You also wonder whether you could later be sued for malpractice if you
fail to file a timely answer.2 9
C. Hypothetical 330
Paul, a widower with a married son and grandchildren, asks you to
help him arrange some charitable gifts and to plan for his future, both
economically and functionally. The mortgage on Paul's home is not yet
retired and his economic resources are quite limited. You suggest some
insurance options, financial strategies, and housing options. Halfway
through your second meeting, Paul informs you that he wants to donate
a substantial portion of his assets immediately to a television evangelist
or to a religious cult. If Paul does this, barring some unexpected infusion
of cash, Paul's remaining assets will not be sufficient to support him even
at a modest level and he may even lose his house.
Paul's son, Jake, does not know about his father's donative plan but,
from what you know of Jake's character, he would feel morally obligated
to sacrifice his own assets, if necessary, to ensure his father's support.
Or, alternatively, the state begins enforcing its family support obligation
laws against children of destitute parents, as a very recent decision of the
South Dakota Supreme Court has allowed. 3 ' Jake has four teenage chil-
27. Tremblay, supra note 11, at 531.
28. For helpful suggestions on client counseling and persuasion techniques that will
enhance the client's decisional abilities as well as the lawyer's ability to understand her
client's point of view, see Smith, supra note 9, at 92-96, and Tremblay, supra note 11, at
577-83.
In structuring these hypotheticals to posit that client counseling and appropriate per-
suasion have not worked, I do not intend to suggest that such techniques infrequently
solve the problem. Such techniques often lead to a satisfactory resolution of the problem,
but that scenario is simply not the focal point of this Article.
29. For a discussion of potential malpractice liability, see infra notes 144-50 and ac-
companying text.
30. This hypothetical was inspired by a hypothetical posed in Frolik & Barnes, supra
note 13, at 82, which I have substantially altered to suit my purposes.
31. See Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, No. 18186, 1994 WL 84169, at *1
(S.D. Mar. 16, 1994). The court observed that
[i]t is certainly reasonable to place a duty to support an indigent parent on that
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dren who plan to attend college and Jake must save for their tuition.
Once again, client counseling and gentle persuasion do nothing to change
Paul's mind.
The client's decision in each hypothetical is explainable on the basis of
both seemingly rational and seemingly irrational thought processes. Ar-
nold, for example, might explain that he must drive to get to work and
keep his job, or that driving gives him his last shred of independence. a2
On the other hand, he might claim that God has told him that his
parent's adult child because they are direct lineal descendants who have re-
ceived the support, care, comfort and guidance of that parent during their mi-
nority.... [N]o other person has received a greater benefit from a parent than
that parent's child and it logically follows that the adult child should bear the
burden of reciprocating on that benefit in the event a parent needs support in
their later years.
Id. at *5.
Although the Randall decision might signal a new trend, currently, most states do not
enforce their family support laws against adult children because the federal government
conditions the receipt of federal funds on the state's agreement not to hold any relative
responsible except as provided in the Medicaid and Social Security Insurance eligibility
rules. Under these rules, the spouse is responsible but the next generation is not. See 42
C.F.R. § 435.602 (1992). I am indebted to Cynthia L. Barrett, Attorney at Law, for
bringing this limitation to my attention.
A typical family support obligation law would provide that "[a]ll children shall be
responsible for supplying necessary goods and services to their parents when their parents
are unable to do so themselves." Lee E. Teitelbaum, Intergenerational Responsibility and
Family Obligation: On Sharing, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 765, 784. This language is not taken
from any particular statute but rather is borrowed from Professor Teitelbaum's descrip-
tion of how such a statute might read. See id. The South Dakota statute at issue in
Randall provides, in part, that "[e]very adult child, having the financial ability so to do
shall provide necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance for a parent who is
unable to provide for himself .... S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-7-27 (1992). Another
example of such a statute provides that "[it is the duty of the... child or children of any
poor person who is unable to maintain himself or herself by work, to maintain such poor
person to the extent of his or her ability." Idaho Code § 32-1002 (1983 & Supp. 1993).
For a recent analysis of current statutes that impose parental support obligations on
adult children, see Ann Britton, America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child's Duty to
Support Aged Parents, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev. 351 (1990). Professor Britton lists filial support
statutes from 29 states, see id. at 358 n.76; however, the number of states that include
such statutes is declining. See id. Even where the statutes exist, the trend is not to en-
force them. See id. at 359-60; Teitelbaum, supra, at 765; see also Catherine D. Byrd,
Commentary, Relative Responsibility Extended: Requirement of Adult Children to Pay
for Their Indigent Parent's Medical Needs, 22 Fam. L.Q. 87, 90-91 (1988) (discussing the
same phenomenon in the context of laws requiring adult children to pay their parents'
medical needs). In 22 states, the statutes have either never been invoked or they have
been invoked extremely rarely. Britton, supra, at 360.
There are, however, at least five states in addition to South Dakota in which the stat-
utes have been used in recent years: Oregon, Louisiana, New Jersey, Ohio, and Penn-
sylvania. See id. at 360-63. In California, there is some evidence that attempts to enforce
such a statute in accord with tables that determined the amount of the relatives' contribu-
tion led to the repeal of the tables. That no cases have reached the state appellate courts
since then suggests that enforcement may have ceased. See id. at 359, 361.
32. In this instance, Arnold resembles Menlove in the famous torts case Vaughan v.
Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). Menlove, although mentally competent, did
not apply the Hand formula, see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d
Cir. 1947), the way the reasonably prudent person would have.
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seizures are the mechanism God has chosen to eliminate sinners. Martha
might quite reasonably claim that she has been taught from childhood to
pay her bills and take the consequences for her mistakes, that it would go
against her value system to resist paying what she agreed to pay, that the
litigation would put her in the embarrassing role of a deadbeat, and that,
at her age, she wants to avoid stress at all costs. On the other hand,
Martha may claim that the unscrupulous roofer, collection agency, or
land speculator is really the devil incarnate and that any attempt at
resistance-even filing an answer-will cause the devil to unleash greater
fury upon her.33 Paul might reasonably explain that he is on a spiritual
plain, that he no longer cares about worldly goods and wants to promote
the religion he believes in by his donation. On the other hand, he may
offer a bizarre explanation.
Professor Luban has suggested that "if any process is going on in the
person's head that can be called 'inference from real facts,' the person is
competent. It is too much to require that the inference be valid, or objec-
tive, or correct, for that is more than competent people can manage. '
Assuming temporarily that most legal experts would accept this test for
decisional competency, the rational explanations in each hypothetical
clearly meet this test.35 The explanation that Martha gives in the hypo-
thetical clearly qualifies as competent under Professor Luban's test.
Upon further inquiry, even some bizarre explanations might reflect a
competently made decision.36 Moreover, all the foregoing explanations
might qualify as competent under the "evidencing a choice" standard,
which "focus[es] only on the presence or absence of a decision." '37 A
person who makes a decision, regardless of its content, is competent
under that test.3" Would the attorney's moral anguish about these seem-
ingly ill-advised decisions be alleviated if the client in each case gave a
rational account of why he made that decision? In any of these cases,
does or should it matter whether the client is age forty-five or seventy-
33. A hypothetical used in Tremblay, supra note 11, at 532, inspired the devil
explanation.
34. Luban, supra note 7, at 479. See also infra note 101.
35. Although Professor Luban's test may be one of the least circular and most appro-
priately neutral tests of the many tests put forth, a finding of competence under his test
does not seem to advance resolution of the types of problems described in this Article.
36. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
Professor Smith cautions that an elderly client suffering from a dementia such as
Alzheimer's disease is not necessarily incompetent. See Smith, supra note 9, at 71. How-
ever, a client may seem less rational if he refuses to admit to himself that he has the
disease. See id. For example, the client may attempt to mask memory gaps, one of the
symptoms of his disease, by inventing stories to bridge them. See id. In doing this, the
client may provide his attorney with bizarre explanations for his requested course of ac-
tion; however, the goal itself may still represent the client's true values and, significantly,
"[d]epending upon the legal issue to be decided, [such a client] may nevertheless be able
to state his goals and be competent." Id.
37. Barbara Stanley et al., The Functional Competency of Elderly at Risk, 28 Geron-






Addressing the first question, I suspect that most lawyers, being
human after all, are mainly bothered by the decision itself-not by how
the client arrived at it. The probability that Arnold will kill or maim
himself or someone else if he has a seizure while driving disturbs Ar-
nold's lawyer. Martha's lawyer feels consternation at the thought of let-
ting an unscrupulous speculator "rip off" Martha's assets, either
throwing her out on the street or onto our already overburdened welfare
rolls. Paul's lawyer cannot get rid of the nagging sense that if Paul's
decision to give his assets to a television evangelist or religious cult will
result in Jake having to pay for Paul's support at the expense of Jake's
children's college education, the decision is perhaps not Paul's alone to
makei °
This is not to deny that the lawyer is also moved by a desire to protect
her client from the consequences of a disastrous decision. In fact, many
practitioners claim they "couldn't care less" about how a course of action
might affect others, being mainly concerned with their own client's wel-
fare.41 But in many cases, the client's long-term welfare may depend on
the lawyer's ability to recognize and deal with the legitimate interests of
others. For example, to stop Paul from impoverishing himself, Paul's
lawyer would probably have to trigger the appointment of a conservator
based on partial incompetency. If, on the other hand, the lawyer ar-
ranged the transfer pursuant to Paul's wishes without challenging his ca-
pacity, Paul's son Jake might well seek to place his father under
conservatorship and to set aside the gift once he discovered it. Alterna-
tively, if Paul's lawyer refused to execute Paul's spoken wishes and was
fired or withdrew, Paul would either find another attorney to do his bid-
ding or wind up with no representation at all. None of these results
seems satisfactory. If our system permitted the lawyer to notify Jake42
39. For a discussion of society's double standard in considering the elderly's decisions
as contrasted with identical decisions made by younger individuals, see Jan E. Rein, Pre-
serving Dignity and Self-Determination of the Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests
and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal for Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1818, 1844-46 (1992).
40. The attorney will feel more comfortable about the situation if Jake, the adversely
affected third party, receives notice of the proposed decision in time to take steps to
protect his own interests. Under our present system, if persuasion fails to move his fa-
ther, Jake's only practical option will be to seek appointment of a conservator to manage
Paul's assets. This will throw the dilemma into the competency construct when the real
issue seems to be one of competing interests between Paul and Jake and Paul and his
lawyer (who may face malpractice claims, among other problems, if she goes along with
Paul's donative scheme). See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text; discussion infra
part IV.
41. Cf Judith Areen, Cases and Materials on Family Law 361 (3d ed. 1992) ("When
I take a case, I am not concerned with whether my client is right or wrong. As far as I
am concerned, a client is always right.... To stand in judgment is too great a luxury.")
(quoting Raoul Felder, Divorce 2-7 (1971)).
42. This could take the form of a simple informal communication to Jake; however,
due to current confidentiality rules, specific authorization by the Model Rules or some
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and then required mediation on these facts, Paul and Jake might reach a
compromise, thus obviating the need for a conservatorship. They might,
for example, agree that Paul should leave the property to the television
evangelist by will rather than by lifetime gift. 3
Thus, the current structure of the attorney-client relationship, coupled
with the either/or choice regarding the client's competency to make cer-
tain decisions, may create unnecessarily extreme positions and results.
Moreover, the protective urge noted above often seduces the lawyer into
deciding the client is incompetent and treating him as such when, in fact,
the client is competent.' On the other hand, if the question is whether
or not to seek a competency determination in court, a lawyer, aware of
the disastrous effects the stigma and loss of control associated with
guardianship can have on a client, may be reluctant to consider the issue
at all."t In Paul's case, neither concern for Jake's family nor an urge to
protect Paul would arise were Paul so wealthy that the gift to the evan-
gelist left him with enough money for his support.46 Would Paul be
competent to make the decision in that case but not in the original hypo-
thetical? If the gift were to a companion who took care of Paul, the
reaction might also be different. The point here is that factors other than
other rule would be required. Informed consent principles may require the lawyer to
inform the client, at the retainer stage, of the possibility of such disclosure in certain types
of situations.
43. This is not to imply that mediation is the solution of choice in all or even most
cases. Its use in this hypothetical is meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive. A whole
panoply of options should be developed for lawyers to use as the situation warrants.
44. See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
Other commentators have noted this circularity problem. See, eg., Luban, supra note
7, at 466, 475 (discussing the role of circularity in paternalistic intervention); Lawrence
A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23
Ariz. L. Rev. 599, 604 (1981) ("The quality and effect of the individual's decision and
behavior result in a determination of incapacity, which, in turn, leads to a finding of
mental illness and the consequent need for a guardian") (footnote omitted); Kapp, supra
note 11, at 28 (in medical context, determining client capacity under the "outcome ap-
proach" focuses on the person's decision). But see Tremblay, supra note 11, at 537 n.92
("The 'outcome test' (whether the choice itself seems 'crazy') of determining competency
is based on tautological reasoning and has been rejected by courts and commentators.").
For descriptions of cases illustrating this circularity problem, see Rein, supra note 39,
at 1876 n.273; Luban, supra note 7, at 480-81.
45. Accord John R. Murphy, Note, Older Clients of Questionable Competency: Mak-
ing Accurate Competency Determinations Through the Utilization of Medical Profession-
als, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 899, 901-02 (1991).
46. But see ENS et al. v. LDS, 6 Penn. Fid. Rptr.2d 1 (C.P. 1985) (finding a member
of a wealthy family, who had made large loans to the Lyndon LaRouche Society, incom-
petent to manage his affairs despite his abundant wealth). Regarding ENS, one suspects
that the large gifts to the LaRouche Society by a weak-minded, but probably not mentally
incompetent, person were just too much for the court to take. One also wonders if that
person would have been deemed incompetent had he made similarly large gifts to a main-
stream religious group like the Catholic or Mormon Church or even to Christian Science.
Se eg., id at 4 ("We are reluctant to equate the importunings of the Lyndon LaRoach
[sic] organization with the message of Christianity or of any of the other recognized reli-
gions."). For a suggestion of how the court might have achieved its goal with less dam-
age to his autonomy and dignity, see infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.
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competency seem more relevant.47 Thus, the issue needs clarification by
removal, or at least deemphasis, of the competency question.
The lawyer faces formidable practical problems as well. "Many defi-
ciencies that appear cognitive are actually caused by overmedication, in-
appropriate medication, poor diet, depression, environmental deficiency,
sensory deprivation, poor eyesight, or impaired hearing. 4a Most law-
yers in ordinary cases simply lack the time and resources to devote the
care and attention even an informal inquiry into a client's task-specific
competency warrants. Moreover, in many cases the lawyer will be
haunted by the specter of potential malpractice liability if she honors her
client's decision.49
I believe this clash of values and interests between attorney and client
creates an inherent conflict of interest that cannot be resolved by decid-
ing the client is either competent or incompetent to make the decision in
question. If the problem is the decision itself and its adverse effects on
society, that problem should be addressed frontally. For at least two rea-
sons, it seems systemically disingenuous and unfair 0 to override a cli-
ent's decision under the guise of a determination, however made, that the
client is incompetent to make the decision in question. First, an inquiry
into a client's capacity, however limited that inquiry may be, provides a
mechanism by which we can treat the individual client as a nonperson,
thereby rationalizing away that person's privacy and autonomy interests.
Second, returning to the question of whether it matters if the client is
forty-five or seventy-five, the elder population is more vulnerable than
the general population to inquiries about competency. There is a defacto
presumption in American society that older people are incompetent until
proven otherwise. Their decisions are more readily challenged.5" Thus,
the competency construct inherently discriminates against older
47. All three hypotheticals were structured so as to make the client's family either
nonexistent or ignorant of the situation. This was done to leave the problem in the law-
yer's lap by removing anyone who might bring legitimate competing interests to the fore
by independently challenging the client's decision.
48. Rein, supra note 39, at 1869.
49. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. Obtaining some kind of hold-
harmless agreement from the client would not help because it would not bind injured
third parties and because the client's competency to make such an agreement could later
be challenged by third parties or by the client himself. Moreover, such agreements are
effectively prohibited by the Model Rules. See Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.8(h)
(prohibiting a lawyer from prospectively limiting her malpractice liability "unless permit-
ted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement"). Seem-
ingly, the best the lawyer can do is to keep detailed memoranda and records of what
transpired between attorney and client and to hope for the best.
50. It also seems counterproductive because getting the right answer depends on ask-
ing the right question. See discussion infra part II.
51. For an elaboration of this de facto presumption, see Rein, supra note 39, at 1840-
44 and authorities cited therein. The de facto presumption exists alongside of and
prevails over the theoretical presumption of competency in probably more cases than we
would care to admit.
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All this does not mean that there is no role for the competency con-
struct. It does mean that the construct is not useful in situations involv-
ing the need to mediate between the client's spoken wishes and legitimate
societal interests, which may include an interest in compromising or even
restraining client choices, whether or not the client is competent. An
equally important point is that whenever the competency model is useful
or unavoidable, we must ensure that it is used competently and carefully
with a view to correcting malfunctions when possible and preserving or
enhancing remaining capacity when correction is impossible.5 3
The foregoing has outlined the problem as I see it. Part II of this
Article sets up some working premises about the competency model.
Part III examines our present framework for resolving dilemmas like
those raised in the hypotheticals, with primary reference to the relevant
ABA Model Rules. A critique of the Model Rules will point out the
seemingly insurmountable problems that arise from the Rules' ambiva-
lence and ambiguity regarding the basis of the attorney-client relation-
ship when the attorney suspects her client is operating under a
disability. 4 Whenever possible, I will suggest specific amendments to
the Model Rules and other changes in the law that might give the attor-
ney more guidance, greater protection, and more options within the pres-
ent structure.
Part IV suggests a different focus or approach to quandaries like those
described-tentatively exploring ways by which we might resolve such
dilemmas without unneossarily questioning the client's competency or in-
52. Because women still tend to outlive men, one might also argue (although the
point is not central to this Article) that the competency model discriminates against
women.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 68-82 (discussing the complexity of compe-
tency determinations and who is and is not competent to make them).
54. In addition, many excellent articles explain and critique the Model Rules relevant
to this subject. See, eg., Jacqueline Allee, Representing Older Personr Ethical Dilem-
mas, Prob. & Prop., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 36, 41 (arguing that the Model Rules thrust attor-
neys into "a maelstrom of ethical complexities, conundra and contradictions"); James R.
Devine, The Ethics of Representing the Disabled Client: Does Model Rule L14 Ade-
quately Resolve the Best Interests/Advocacy Dilemma?, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 493 (1984) (claim-
ing that Model Rule 1.14 forces a lawyer to assume and balance the roles of advocate and
guardian); Falk, supra note 11 (arguing that "the attorney can find clear guidance from
the Rules of Professional Conduct, case law, ethics opinions, and common sense" when
confronted with an elderly client and the client's relative); Kapp, supra note 11 (opining
that Model Rule 1.14 and its comments indicate that the attorney's duty to protect the
elderly client's interests extend beyond the resolution of the immediate problem); Smith,
supra note 9, at 78 (arguing that the Model Rules "are ultimately unsatisfying guides for
the attorney representing a questionably competent client"); Strauss & Dubler, supra note
11 (arguing that the Model Rules fail to offer adequate guidance for the lawyer who
represents a client whose competence is in doubt); Tremblay, supra note 11 (suggesting
that a lawyer may seek guardianship for a client of questionable competence only in
extreme cases and that reliance on persuasion and on family members may be appropri-
ate); Murphy, supra note 45 (noting that the Model Rules "offer little advice regarding
the method by which a lawyer can determine whether his client is mentally competent").
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terfering with his autonomy any more than we would or should interfere
with the autonomy of a competent adult who made the identical deci-
sion. One approach might be to develop devices by which outside agen-
cies can mitigate the adverse effects of an antisocial decision without
overriding it or enlisting the decision-maker's cooperation at all. When
this approach is not feasible, some principled guidelines will be needed
for determining when society's interest in honoring the decisions of
adults, competent or not, is outweighed by other vital societal interests.
The task of developing legal mechanisms by which competing interests
can be alerted and weighed in the balance without demeaning the indi-
vidual or gutting the lawyer's duty of loyalty is a daunting one, indeed."
But once society frankly recognizes a need, legal mechanisms to meet it
usually follow, albeit slowly. If we place the debate on a sound footing,
good minds will find the needed mechanisms and solutions.
All this may sound like heresy from a proponent of the rights of indi-
viduals to run their own lives.56 But because interdependent human be-
55. I am aware of the common wisdom that lawyers within the attorney-client rela-
tionship, although they have obligations to the legal profession and its ideals of public
service, see Model Rules, supra note 12, pmbl., do not owe a duty to society at large.
They are not private attorneys general. This view has already been qualified in some
instances involving class action, derivative, and civil rights suits. For more on this sub-
ject, see Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney Generah Perspectives
from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 353, 353-57 (1988);
Jonathan R. Macy & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff's Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1991). For a discussion of the range of modern class actions suits, see
Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action 239-
44 (1987) (discussing racial discrimination, consumerism, and environmentalism).
Even assuming arguendo the inviolability and correctness of this view in all cases, use
of the competency construct contradicts this principle. When a lawyer or guardian pur-
sues her own or society's interests using a client's incapacity as a rationale, she is acting
as an attorney for herself or as a private attorney general under the cloak of the compe-
tency construct.
56. Actually, the approach suggested here is consistent with the views I expressed in
Rein, supra note 39, where I urged that "[b]efore a court interferes with... fundamental
interests over the proposed ward's objections, the petitioner should be required ... to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that such a drastic step is absolutely necessary to
protect third-party or societal interests of the highest magnitude." Id. at 1870. I also
noted that
[m]y own weighing of... competing [economic] interests would lead me to say
that if the only threat is to third-party expectations of inheritance or tax sav-
ings, the court should not override the proposed ward's objections. On the
other hand, if the proposed ward's decisions threaten to impoverish a person or
force that person to expend substantial amounts of his or her own funds for the
proposed ward's support, some compromise may be warranted.
Id. at 1870 n.254. Even if an individual's decision or proposed course of action will
impoverish only himself, it is arguable that his choice should be compromised or re-
strained, not because he is incompetent but because decisions like his, in the aggregate,
put additional burdens on society's already scarce resources and are otherwise harmful to
the social fabric. My own views on how to weigh the competing interests in cases like
Hypothetical 2 are still quite preliminary and fraught with ambivalence. See discussion
infra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
On the one hand, the policy of allowing individuals to make their own choices is enti-
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ings cannot exercise autonomy without nurturance from the community,
autonomy cannot mean mere "freedom from restraint. 5-7 If a commu-
nity and its members have a symbiotic relationship, individual autonomy
cannot be uncoupled from a corresponding obligation to respect the legit-
tled to enormous weight. As Justice Kristen Glen observed in a case involving a pro-
posed conservatorship,
The fact that someone else might, or could make better choices is not the
point. In a constitutional system such as ours which prizes and protects indi-
vidual liberties to make decisions, even bad ones, the right to make those deci-
sions must be preserved.
The integrity of the elderly, no less than any other group of our citizens,
should not be invaded, nor their freedom of choice taken from them by the state
simply because we believe that decisions could be "better" made by someone
else.
In re Fischer, 552 N.Y.S.2d 807, 813 n.17, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). Similarly, as one
recommendation of judicial practices in guardianship stated,
Individuals with disabilities should not be required to make decisions that are
responsible in the eyes of a judge when the rest of the population is free to make
its own decisions; like other citizens, they should be allowed to make mistakes
or to make decisions that may not be socially acceptable or wise.
National Conference of the Judiciary on Guardianship Proceedings for the Elderly, State-
ment of Recommended Judicial Practices 35 (1986). Moreover, "studies by psychiatrists,
psychologists, gerontologists, and environmental psychologists provide persuasive evi-
dence that the mental health of many elderly individuals deteriorates greatly when they
are denied the opportunity to make their own choices and exert control over their own
lives." Rein, supra note 39, at 1836. Loss of control can produce serious depression. See
Phillip NV. Brickner, Older People: Issues and Problems from a Medical Viewpoint, in
Bioethics and Human Rights 191, 193 (Elsie L. Bandman & Bertram Bandman eds.,
1978). Even rats decline when they lose control of a situation. See Richard M. Restak,
The Mind 76-79 (1988); see also Michael A. Fox, The Case for Animal Experimentation
100-02 (1986) (dealing with dogs); Martin E. P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression,
Development, and Death 23-25 (1975) (describing research testing on learned helpless-
ness in dogs); idL at 169-75 (discussing the sudden death of animals-including rats-that
resulted from learned helplessness and hopelessness).
On the other hand, societal interests and the desire to protect Martha from making an
irrevocable choice she may later regret seem at least equally weighty. Professor Trem-
blay observes that
intervention might be better viewed as protecting freedom and autonomy be-
cause it seeks to preserve options that are not being sacrificed consciously but
that will be lost without intervention. This reasoning was applied by John Stu-
art Mill even to those who choose to give up future freedom and autonomy.
For instance, Mill did not extend his radical antipaternalism to contracts for
perpetual involuntary servitude. "The principle of freedom cannot require that
he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his
freedom."
Tremblay, supra note 11, at 555 n. 168 (quoting J.S. Mill, On Liberty 104 (1947), quoted
in Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism in Morality and the Law 107, 118 (S. Wasserstrom ed.,
1976)). Analytically speaking, I part ways with Professor Tremblay (and, perhaps, John
Stuart Mill) in that I would not confine this type of analysis to cases of unconscious
sacrifice. Whether or not the choice is conscious, the question is whether there exists an
overarching policy reason for interfering with it.
57. Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 Cal. L Rev. 445, 446
(1987).
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imate interests and goals of the community and its other members. 58 An
approach that frankly recognizes the issue as one of competing interests
and the need for mediation between them will allow far fewer and less
permanent incursions on an individual's dignity and far fewer instances
of attorney disloyalty than the competency model, which allows so many
forms of surrogate decision-making for the benefit of societal or other
competing interests once the label "partly incompetent," "partly inca-
pacitated," or "partly disabled" is affixed. Telling someone he cannot do
exactly what he wants because it will unfairly harm someone else is far
more humanizing and dignity-preserving than telling him that he cannot
do it because he is incompetent to make that decision. The former digni-
fies the individual by making him work things out with others as we all
must do; the latter degrades the individual by telling him he is no longer
fit to play the game of life.
II. WORKING PREMISES ABOUT THE COMPETENCY CONSTRUCT
You don't really want that. You just think you do because your deci-
sionmaking mechanisms are impaired. How do I know? If they weren't
impaired you wouldn't want that 59
58. There is a modem tendency to associate rationality with maximizing gains of
one sort or another, whether they be profits, payloads, Nielsen ratings, or mis-
siles. But anchored rationality has the effect of multiplying commitments. The
pursuit of any given end is restrained by taking account of consequences for
other ends whose fate we care about but that might be ignored or slighted. The
language of maximization is or should be an early warning that rationality, de-
tached from reason, is out of control.
[R]eason connotes prudence or practical wisdom. In the governance of
human affairs, reason is flexible, substantive, and circumstantial. It applies gen-
eral principles in a spirit of restraint and with respect for the values at stake in
particular situations. Reason recoils from mechanical, rule-bound, or ideologi-
cal thinking....
Prudence is not a call to expedience or opportunism; neither is it a narrowly
technical assessment of how to reach a given end. Rather, prudence is the will
and the capacity to make moral judgments in concrete settings, and to do so in
ways that take account of what the situation requires, not what an abstraction
demands. In prudential judgment, rules and principles are filtered through the
fabric of social life. There is due regard for human shortsightedness and unin-
tended effects, for alternative options, competing interests, and multiple values.
Id. at 459-60.
Whether, as an original matter, the community precedes the individual or vice versa,
cf Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 963,
965-66 (1987) ("Those in contemporary ethics ... argue [that] ... communities of per-
sons are prior in life and in culture to individuals .... "), the current reality is that all
individuals are members of one or more communities. Whether they are good or bad
communities largely depends on the extent to which the community and its members
demonstrate mutual respect and support. Hence, when this Article proposes policy re-
straints on individual selfishness, it demands a corresponding showing of concern and
respect from the community toward the individual so restrained. Whether the commu-
nity can rightfully expect good citizenship from members it has excluded or failed to
nourish is a fascinating question beyond the scope of this Article.
59. Luban, supra note 7, at 466 (emphasis added).
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"The trick," says Professor Luban, "is to come up with a notion of
incompetence that is not self-justifying and self-serving."'  This Article
posits that this cannot be done in any way that can be practically applied
without unacceptable room for human error. This position proceeds
from six working premises:
1. It is nearly impossible to develop a test for competency or capacity
that is completely noncircular either in its reasoning or application.6'
2. Even if a noncircular test could be developed, it could not be rou-
tinely applied in a noncircular manner. This is partly because most law-
yers, judges, and doctors lack the time, expertise, and resources needed
to apply any competency test with the rigor the seriousness of the ques-
tion warrants. It is also (I suspect primarily) because of human nature.
Human beings, by their very nature, tend to see things through the lens
of their own values, life experiences, and perceptions. Many determina-
tions, therefore, are the product of mere speculation.
3. The consequences of an erroneous determination of even partial
incompetency can be so dire that it is dangerous and unfair to the poten-
tial objects of such inquiries to let unqualified lawyers (or unqualified
doctors) loose with such a concept.
4. Even if a noncircular test could be devised and applied in a compe-
tent, neutral, and otherwise acceptable manner, the exercise would still
not resolve the kinds of dilemmas discussed in Part I.
5. Efforts to cabin this elusive and unruly concept and to make it
work for us in resolving such dilemmas have produced only greater
confusion.
6. Because getting the right answer depends on asking the right ques-
tion, it is time to entertain the possibility that we have been asking the
wrong question.
Before elaborating on these working premises (which unavoidably
overlap to some degree), some discussion of the lawyer's role in compe-
tency determinations under the Model Rules is warranted.
Model Rule 1.14, as expanded upon in the comments, places the re-
sponsibility of competency determination on the lawyer at four junctures.
First, although the Rules do not state this explicitly, the lawyer must
determine if the client has sufficient functional or decisional ability even
to form an attorney-client relationship.62 Second, if a transaction needs
to be accomplished or a decision made, the lawyer must determine
whether the client has the degree of competence needed to engage in the
particular transaction or to make the particular decision.63 Neither Rule
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
62. The Model Rules' introductory Scope section explains that "for purposes of deter-
mining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to
these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists." Model Rules, supra
note 12, Scope, 3.
63. See id Rule 1.14 cmt. 1.
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1. 14 nor its comment mention intermittent capacity, but presumably the
lawyer would be called upon to determine the client's mental state at the
relevant time were that an issue. Third, according to Comment 2 to Rule
1. 14, if the client lacks a guardian or legal representative, the lawyer may
be called upon to decide if her client is sufficiently incompetent or inca-
pacitated to justify her taking over as de facto guardian.' 4 Finally, ac-
cording to Rule 1.14(b), "when the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest" (whatever that
means), the lawyer "may seek the appointment of a guardian or take
other protective action."65 Comment 3 advises the lawyer to "see to such
an appointment where it would serve the client's best interests" (again,
according to whom?).66 After noting that this course might prove "ex-
pensive or traumatic for the client," Comment 3 leaves the entire matter
in the lawyer's lap by stating: "Evaluation of these considerations is a
matter of professional judgment on the lawyer's part."67
Taking up my second working premise first, lawyers are not qualified
to make competency determinations.68 In fact, neither are most doctors.
"Instances of misdiagnosis are commonplace." 69 Consider the following
report.
The experts muffed Lela Caris's case ....
She was declared incompetent when psychiatrists said her mental
confusion couldn't be treated. Today, Mrs. Caris is 92, plays the piano
64. See id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 2.
65. Id. Rule 1.14(b).
66. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 3.
67. Id.
68. Accord Murphy, supra note 45, at 907. As Mr. Murphy observes,
[l]awyers are not trained to recognize the differences between the natural effects
of age and the effects of a mental impairment, the types of mental incompetency
that may be temporary or reversible, and the subtle indications that a person's
mental health may be in the process of declining and may soon leave him inca-
pable of carrying out a legal transaction.
Id.
69. Rein, supra note 39, at 1869; see generally Chairman of Subcomm. on Health and
Long-Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Abuses in
Guardianship of the Elderly and Infirm: A National Disgrace 59, 67 (Comm. Print 1987)
[hereinafter Abuses] (observing that misdiagnoses of incompetence are commonplace);
Gerald K. Goodenough, The Lack of Objectivity of Physician Evaluations in Geriatric
Guardianship Cases, 14 J. Contemp. L. 53 (1988) (discussing the unfairness that results
from the absence of objective measures of mental capacity for determining competency of
elderly subjects); Joan M. Krauskopf, New Developments in Defending Commitment of
the Elderly, 10 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 367 (1980) (discussing problems involving
treatable conditions or diseases that mimic symptoms of Alzheimer's disease or senile
dementia). Stephen J. Anderer observes:
Examinations ... have been performed by plastic surgeons, urologists, gynecol-
ogists, and the petitioner, if performed at all. The testimony that is offered [at
guardianship hearings] has been called conclusory by numerous commentators.
In spite of these deficiencies, medical evaluations usually are dispositive: courts
are unlikely to depart from the assessments of physicians.
Anderer, supra note 13, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
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... , takes walks, enjoys bridge, attends two church circles and has
regained her rights....
And the experts were wrong about Mary, a 66-year-old... woman.
Mary was deemed senile and non-treatable. She was declared in-
competent, but she recovered a few weeks later .... "It was just a brief
emotional illness," she says.
"There are no safeguards," says Dr. Theodore Machler Jr., a past
president of the Pinellas County Psychiatric Association. "There are a
lot of people in Pinellas County who are declared incompetent and
have reversible conditions that are never discovered." 70
Consider also the following exchange between Dr. Leonard Hellman
of the Mercy Senior Health Clinic of Denver, Colorado (who also is an
attorney) and Mr. Daniel M. Taubman, Director, Colorado Coalition of
Legal Services Programs, Denver, Colorado:
TAUBMAN Is there anything that a lawyer can do to determine
whether a client is competent, or should a lawyer always refer the situ-
ation to a doctor for a medical opinion?
HELLMAN: I think the courts rely on physician input. I am one of
the few physicians who does not believe that physicians have the an-
swer to this. I think that social workers and psychologists have a bet-
ter handle on competency than most physicians, who don't even take
the time to do some of the testing I am talking about. So I'm kind of a
pariah in the field with my own colleagues. But I can't imagine an
attorney, no matter what his background is, in a legal office trying to
determine competence It should never get to that stage before having a
full mental evaluation. This potentially can be a very serious depriva-
tion of rights.7 1
As indicated, "[m]any deficiencies that appear cognitive are actually
caused by overmedication, inappropriate medication, poor diet, depres-
sion, environmental deficiency, sensory deprivation, poor eyesight, or im-
paired hearing."' 72 Many of these apparent deficiencies are reversible or
correctable.73 Although the test may be a legal one,74 in fairness, no one
should jump to the conclusion that the client is partially or totally inca-
pacitated or a candidate for surrogate decisionmaking without "a careful
70. Jeffrey Good & Larry King, Exams are Often Shallow, reprinted in Abuses, supra
note 69, at 66.
71. Health Care Options, supra note 11, at 24 (emphasis added).
72. Rein, supra note 39, at 1869 (citing Goodenough, supra note 69, at 55); see also
Murphy, supra note 45, at 906-10 (discussing how ill-equipped lawyers are to distinguish
mental impairment from age appropriate or temporary/correctable conditions); Smith,
supra note 9, at 62-64, 68-71 (discussing the importance of a lawyer's ability to recognize
age-related mental and physical disorders in order to effectively serve elderly clients).
73. See Goodenough, supra note 69, at 55.
74. See, ,,g., ABA Comm'n on the Mentally Disabled & ABA Comm'n on Legal
Problems of the Elderly, Guardianship: An Agenda for Reform 15 (1989) [hereinafter
An Agenda for Reform]; Anderer, supra note 13, at 22; Frolik & Barnes, supra note 13,
at 965.
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and competent determination regarding the causes of the ... [apparent]
decisional dysfunction or impairment."" But this is no small matter.
Although Comment 5 to Rule 1.14 says "[t]he lawyer may seek guidance
from an appropriate diagnostician,"76 I cannot imagine a lawyer in the
middle of an initially routine case (like Arnold's contract dispute or
Martha's $8000 roofing problem) obtaining the kind of full-fledged medi-
cal and psychiatric workup needed even to begin to accurately assess the
client's true decisional abilities." Who would authorize such an inquiry?
Who would pay for it?7 8
To bring home the magnitude of what may, depending on the client's
75. Rein, supra note 39, at 1868.
76. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14 cmt. 5.
77. Indeed, to the great discredit of our current system, such a workup is rarely even
done in connection with petitions for guardianship or conservatorship where the central
issue is the proposed ward's competency or capacity. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing newspaper article:
Court-ordered competency examinations can be quick and shallow. They in-
volve guesswork. Diagnoses are often reached without medical records. Some-
times they are conflicting. A few are based on brief chats with hostile people
through screen doors.
Pinellas Circuit Judge Thomas E. Penick Jr.... is troubled by the system's
shortcomings.
"I am concerned about.., going up to the door, talking for five minutes and
coming back and saying a person's incompetent," Penick says. "You've got to
have a more in-depth examination up front."
Yet Pinellas judges have routinely accepted the psychiatrists' reports anyway.
Sometimes the psychiatrists arrive unannounced at a person's home. Patients
can get angry or flustered, affecting their appearance.
"It stinks. Some guy walks up to the door who they've never seen before and
it upsets these old people." ... "They don't know whether they're being held up
or raped, and sometimes it's hard to tell the difference."
Occasionally doctors reach conclusions about wary patients who won't even
let them in the door.
[ * * F]or example, a 91-year old ...woman wouldn't let Dr. Ricardo
Maribena into her house. "Patient examined through screen door as she would
not let me in," his report said. Despite the limits of the exam, he diagnosed an
Alzheimer's related disease and recommended incompetency.
The woman had a guardian appointed for her.
Good & King, supra note 70, at 66-67. See also Anderer, supra note 13, at 18 (noting that
incapacity determinations have been made on conclusory testimony of plastic surgeons,
urologists, and gynecologists); Abuses, supra note 69, at 15 (some competency examina-
tions are performed by retired court clerks). It should be noted that a few recent reform
statutes do now require a thorough workup. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.331(3)(c)
(West 1994) (requiring a comprehensive examination including, if appropriate, a physical
examination, a mental health examination, and a functional assessment); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 27-7-22B(3) (Michie 1992) ("The evaluation of an adult shall include at a minimum ...
an evaluation of the adult's present physical, mental and social conditions, including, as
necessary, a medical, psychological, psychiatric or social evaluation and review .... ).
78. We shall return to this topic later. See infra notes 178-209 and accompanying
text.
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condition, be required to make a competent assessment, consider the fol-
lowing, extensively quoted geriatric psychiatrist's description of a model
assessment:
There are four basic goals of the psychiatric evaluation. First it is im-
portant to determine whether the symptoms are a manifestation of psy-
chiatric disorder, an underlying medical disease, or a normative
phenomenon ....
Once it is determined that a pathological condition exists, the second
goal is to discover any treatable or reversible causes for the condition.
The geriatric psychiatrist must conduct a thorough medical evaluation,
since older patients may have one or more medical conditions with
symptoms that mimic psychiatric illness. Conversely, psychiatric
symptoms may be a manifestation of an underlying medical disorder.
The evaluation must detect the presence of cardiovascular disease, en-
docrine abnormalities, metabolic disturbances, vitamin deficiency,
drugs and toxins, infectious diseases, tumors, immune diseases,
trauma, and neurological conditions. Within each of these categories,
there are many diseases which can cause or aggravate psychiatric dis-
orders, and some of these are treatable and reversible. The third objec-
tive of the psychiatric evaluation is to assess the functional level of the
patient and determine the degree of disability caused by disorder or
disease.... This is where geriatric evaluation goes beyond traditional
medical diagnostics. Fourth, the evaluation helps to ascertain what
supports the patient already has and what additional resources the pa-
tient requires in order to function in the most optimal way possible.
... For patients who have suspected dementia, [a comprehensive
evaluation] begins with a complete history, in which the symptoms are
fully described, medical conditions and their treatments reviewed, cur-
rent medications listed, and family history and social history elicited.
Particular attention should be paid to a history of systemic diseases,
head trauma, nutritional compromise, substance abuse, prescription
medication use, and exposure to environmental toxins. This is crucial,
because all of these factors may be associated with dementia and in
many cases may aggravate or even cause the dementia.
The next component of the evaluation is the physical examination.
Again, this is conducted to discover treatable causes of the dementia.
A mental status examination is performed to assess the patient's mood,
affect, thinking, behavior, and various aspects of cognitive function
such as attention, concentration, memory, abstract thinking and
judgment....
The next part of the routine evaluation includes laboratory testing[,]
neurosychological [sic] testing, and brain imaging. Laboratory tests
that are routine in the evaluation of dementia include a urinalysis;
complete blood counts to screen for anemia, infection, and malignan-
cies; a serologic test for syphilis; vitamin B12 and folate levels; and
blood chemistries to detect abnormal liver, kidney, and thyroid func-
tion. A CT scan of the head or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
also are done routinely. These can be useful in visualizing strokes,
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brain tumors, blood and trauma. Ideally, when resources permit,
neuropsychological testing should be done, since this may be useful for
distinguishing the types of dementia and the extent of cognitive impair-
ment. The need to do other tests is determined on an individual basis,
depending mostly on the findings from the history of the physical ex-
amination. These might include a spinal tap to examine the cerebral
spinal fluid for signs of infection, bleeding, tumors or immune diseases;
an electroencephalogram to detect seizures and abnormalities that may
be present with metabolic disturbances or tumors; a toxicology screen
looking for drugs or heavy metals; HIV testing when AIDS is sus-
pected; and further serology when Lyme disease is a possibility.
Once the diagnosis is established and the underlying cause is deter-
mined, the evaluation turns to a functional assessment. This is because
the diagnosis by itself doesn't tell us the extent of disability caused by
the illness.... Once the patient's functional level has been assessed, the
next step is to determine which needs are currently being met and
which are not. Here social workers can be particularly helpful in dis-
cerning any mismatch between needs and resources. This part of the
evaluation is critical, because in addition to medical treatment of con-
ditions associated with dementia, the mainstay of management is coor-
dination of needed support services.79
As this description suggests, "modem science is beginning to teach us
that mental deterioration, erroneously assumed to be the unavoidable
product of aging, is not a natural or inevitable feature of the aging pro-
cess."80 As a study of California conservatorships points out, "[m]odern
research is blowing away many stereotypes and misbeliefs about elderly
people and the aging process."8 A "seat of the pants" approach to de-
termining competency might have been understandable before modern
medicine proved how much mind and body affect each other and how
very complicated the question of competency really is. But now that we
know better, it seems unforgivable to label or treat someone as partially
or totally incompetent or incapacitated without first offering that individ-
ual the kind of sophisticated medical assessment needed to determine
79. J. Streim, M.D., The Role of the Geriatric Psychiatrist in Evaluation of Mental
Health Problems in Elderly Patients, Address to the Training Conference on Mental
Health and Aging sponsored by Philadelphia Bar Association Young Lawyers Section,
Senior Citizens Judicare Project, and Elderly Law Project of Community Legal Services
(Apr. 26, 1989), reprinted in Frolik & Barnes, supra note 13, at 878-80.
According to one geriatric physican, a basic diagnostic workup would cost approxi-
mately $2000, representing the cost of CAT scans, laboratory fees, and physicians serv-
ices. This figure would not cover any therapy. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with
Sandra Reynolds, Research Assistant to Professor Kate Wilbur of the University of
Southern California, Andrus Gerontology Center (Nov. 4, 1993) (relaying information
from Thomas X. Cuyegkeng, M.D., MSG). I am indebted to Ms. Reynolds, Professor
Wilbur, and Dr. Cuyegkeng for gathering this data. Although this shows how complex
and costly a proper determination of competency can be, it is not meant to suggest that
every case merits such an extensive evaluation.
80. Rein, supra note 39, at 1841.
81. Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship in
California, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 273, 284 (1988).
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whether such a conclusion is justified. 2
Returning to my first working premise, apart from questions of qualifi-
cations and practicality, any test for competency is bound to be circular
in its reasoning or application. Although this proposition cannot be
proved definitively, circumstantial evidence suggests this conclusion.
First, there are the cases in which determinations have been arrived at
in a circular manner. A Georgia court, for example, appointed an adult
daughter "as guardian of her mother's property because the 65-year-old
widow spent $35,000 on a third home, took a vacation with two adult
sons (leaving her petitioner-daughter at home), and spent money
freely.' 58 3 A trial court found
that, due to advanced age and perhaps mental disability, the mother
lacked the ability to manage her property, [and this finding] was held
to be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Yet, the evidence
indicated only that the mother had maintained several households, had
taken an extensive (and presumably expensive) vacation with two of
her adult sons, and could not account for how she had spent several
thousand dollars. The widow had plenty of money, but the court ap-
parently did not consider that she was simply spending money on
things that gave her pleasure.8"
In another guardianship case, a court
declared Mr. S. incompetent and placed him under the guardianship of
his stepson because Mr. S. insisted on leaving his estate to friends in-
stead of family. Mr. S.'s decision was cited as the primary evidence of
incompetency in a report that stated:
It is evident that Mr. S. does have a great deal of understanding of
what is going on around him. However, he does clearly suffer from a
lack of judgment. As the head nurse, Mrs. J., indicated, he doesn't see
why he shouldn't be allowed to give away all his money since it is
his.85
Similarly,
a guardian ad litem report on Mrs. F., a 76-year-old woman, inferred a
lack of competency from Mrs. F.'s choice of a companion. The report
sanctimoniously stated:
Unfortunately, Mrs. F. has not always used good judgment in han-
dling her affairs and in making decisions as is attested to by the fact
that during the past couple of years, she has kept company with Max
82. Some reform statutes attempt to rectify this problem by requiring more sophisti-
cated competency evaluations in competency determinations. See, eg., Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 744.331 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (detailing the various components of the examina-
tion and the examining committee).
83. Rein, supra note 39, at 1876 n.274 (citing Cummings v. Stanford, 388 S.E. 2d 729
(Ga. CL App. 1989)).
84. Rein, supra note 39, at 1828 n.36 (footnotes omitted).
85. Id. at 1876 n.274 (quoting Kris Bulcroft et al., Elderly Wards and Their Legal
Guardians: Analysis of County Probate Records in Ohio and Washington, 31 Gerontolo-
gist 156, 160 (1991)).
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M., a man with an allegedly dubious character and an alcoholic.
86
Consider also the following example in the health care decision-mak-
ing context:
Mrs. E., 82 years old, has been a resident in a nursing home for 4
years. An alert, relatively vigorous and active woman, she has recently
undergone surgery for the removal of a malignant ovarian tumor. Her
surgery and post-surgical convalescence prove to be more protracted,
painful, and emotionally draining than she had anticipated. After sur-
gery she begins a chemotherapy regimen, but she experiences extreme
nausea and weakness from the first treatment. She refuses to continue
with chemotherapy, telling her son[:] "First, the awful surgery, and
now this. I've never been so sick. I don't want any more chemo. If
the cancer comes back, I'll deal with it."
Her physician and others try to convince her to continue with the
treatment, but she remains adamant. "It makes sense for younger peo-
ple, but not for me." Mrs. E.'s son is very troubled by this decision.
He tells the physician that he thinks his mother's decision is tragically
unreasonable. He urges that everything possible be done to change her
mind and even asks whether there is some way they can "press" his
mother into continuing with chemotherapy. In response, the physician
arranges a psychiatric consult for Mrs. E.s 7
Here, what appears to be (under the circumstances) a completely rational
decision to encounter a risk, was interpreted as evidence of incompetency
or incapacity. As Dr. Collopy notes
[T]his case illustrates [that] refusal of care easily serves as the deci-
sional gate for challenges to competency. But if the social, institu-
tional, and professional canons [that] determine 'indicated' care are
not checked by the principle of self-determination, competency can
come to mean little more than obedience to the value system of
caregiving institutions and professions. In such a situation, the elderly
run the risk of being judged decisionally incapacitated simply by being
sharply and singularly individual, by being decisionally irregular.88
Other instances of such circular application abound but are not
documented.89
In addition to the circular application, there is the circular,90 value-
laden ambiguous, vague, and overinclusive language one finds in so many
of the tests for and definitions of incompetency or incapacity. 9'
86. Rein, supra note 39, at 1876 n.274 (quoting Bulcroft, supra note 85, at 162).
87. Bart J. Collopy, Autonomy in Long Term Care: Some Crucial Distinctions, 28
Gerontologist 10, 13 (Supp. 1988) (citations omitted).
88. Id. (citations omitted).
89. For another interesting example of such circular application, see the discussion of
ENS et al. v. LDS, infra nn.273-80 and accompanying text.
90. As an instance of circular language, "mental incompetency in the area of con-
tracts and wills becomes defined as that type or degree of mental unsoundness sufficient
to destroy the client's capacity to enter a contract or make a will." Murphy, supra note
45, at 909.
91. Accord Milton D. Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. Rev.
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Although I believe that human nature (rather than the language of the
tests and definitions) is primarily responsible for circular application in
real life cases,92 unavoidably value-laden or overbroad language also en-
courages, even sanctions, such circular application. I say unavoidably
because tests that are devoid of value-laden language tend to be meaning-
less, or not particularly helpful,93 when it comes to real life application,
while definitions that are refined tend to become treatises. Whatever the
reasons, most of the tests and definitions are dangerously vague and
"contain subjective, value-laden modifiers that invite the decisionniaker
to impose society's values" 94 on those whose capacity is questioned."'
The Model Rules' definition is no exception. Model Rule 1.14(a), for
example, speaks of the ability vel non "to make adequately considered
decisions,"96 while Model Rule 1.14(b) speaks of the client's inability to
act "adequately ... in [his] own interest."9'  Moreover, there is little
consistency among the tests. In fact, they contradict each other9" or are
internally inconsistent.99 As an early commentator said of the judicial
tests alone
if one reads the cases critically it will be found that no verbal formula-
tion of a test can be made which will fit the standards laid down by the
courts. So diverse is the phraseology of the test by courts in different
jurisdictions, and even by various opinions within the same jurisdic-
tion, that no single statement of a rule can be constructed which, if it
has meaning, will not exclude a majority of the cases. 10
Even if an attorney could make sense of all the tests, she could still apply
whatever test she chose from the perspective of her own life experiences
and values. If the primary burden of competency determination is placed
on the lawyer (as under the Model Rules), the inevitable result is a near
total lack of accountability and an absence of effective safeguards against
unjustified paternalism.
At the other end of the spectrum, jumping ahead to my fourth work-
ing premise, the noncircular tests that have been promulgated do not
seem useful for solving the kinds of problems addressed in this Article.
141, 165 (1941); Murphy, supra note 45, at 904, 906-10; Bobbe S. Nolan, R.N., Func-
tional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings, 12 L. Med. & Health Care,
210, 210-11 (1984).
92. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
94. Rein, supra note 39, at 1878.
95. For a discussion of guardianship statutes containing value-laden qualifiers, see id.
1878-80.
96. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14(a) (emphasis added).
97. Id. Rule 1.14(b) (emphasis added).
98. See Arnold J. Rosoff & Gary L. Gottlieb, M.D., M.B.A., Preserving Personal Au-
tonomy for the Elderly: Competency, Guardianship, and Alzheimer's Disease, 8 J. Legal
Med. 1, 12-14 (1987).
99. For a summary description of the major medical, judicial, and statutory tests as
well as those suggested by various academicians, see infra note 101.
100. Green, supra note 91, at 147 (citations omitted).
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Many tests for and approaches to determining competency have been
promulgated by legal experts, medical experts, and various commissions,
with new recommendations, refinements, and prototypical statutes con-
tinually pouring forth. 10 1 This phenomenon alone suggests that after de-
101. In the medical field, competency, along with disclosure of relevant information
and freedom of choice, is one component of the doctrine of informed consent. See Bar-
bara Stanley et al., The Functional Competency of Elderly at Risk, 28 Gerontologist 53,
53 (1988). Even in the medical field, the test for competency may vary from onejurisdic-
tion to another. See John Parry, Decision-making Rights Over Persons and Property, in
Samuel J. Brakel et al., The Mentally Disabled and the Law 435, 450 (3d ed. 1985); see
also Stanley, supra, at 53-54 (delineating six standards of competency, including evidenc-
ing a choice, factual comprehension, quality of reasoning, appreciation of the nature of
the situation, reasonable outcome of choice, and status); Kapp, supra note 11, at 28 (de-
lineating three approaches including the outcome approach, the status test, and the func-
tional approach).
In addition, there have been proposals for "new and improved" tests for determining
decision-making capacity in the medical, informed consent context. See, e.g., President's
Comm'n for the Study to Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, I Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of In-
formed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship 57-62 (1982) quoted in Frolik &
Barnes, supra note 13, at 90 ("Decision-making capacity requires, to a greater or lesser
degree: (1) possession of a set of values and goals; (2) the ability to communicate and to
understand information; and (3) the ability to reason and to deliberate about one's
choices.") Further confusing this area in the medical field is what one commentator has
coined "decisional incapacity," or a physician's medical determination based on func-
tional considerations, which would "allow for more immediacy than the courts provide"
yet would purportedly not involve any deprivation of rights. Dallas M. High, Planning
for Decisional Incapacity: A Neglected Area in Ethics and Aging, 35 Med. Ethics &
Human. 814, 814-15 (1987).
In the legal field, there are separate tests to determine the requisite level of competency
to enter into contracts, to make wills, or to marry. For example, contract law tradition-
ally states that the test for mental incompetency as a basis for avoiding a contract is "the
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the transaction in question,"
which is known as the cognitive test. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.6, at 240 (2d
ed. 1990). However, some cases recognize that a person can satisfy the cognitive under-
standing test "but nevertheless lack[ ] effective control of [his actions], a situation charac-
teristic of the manic-depressive," and suggest that a " 'volitional' test be applied" instead.
Id. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts "add[s] to the traditional cognitive test a
qualified volitional test: 'if by reason of mental illness or defect... he is unable to act in a
reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know
of his condition.'" Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)) (alteration
in original).
The formula for testamentary capacity is usually stated as the ability to "understand
(1) the nature and extent of his property; (2) the persons who are the natural objects of
his bounty; and (3) the disposition he is making of his property." William M. McGovern,
Jr., Sheldon F. Kurtz, & Jan Ellen Rein, Wills, Trusts and Estates § 7.1 (1988).
There appears to be no clear consensus among states as to the test for mental compe-
tency to marry, largely because the courts are influenced by their states' individual statu-
tory policies. See 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States § 2.16 (2d ed. 1987). The test is often stated as the " 'capacity to understand the
nature of the contract, and the duties and responsibilities which it creates,'" id. at 184
(quoting Durham v. Durham, 10 P.D. 80, 82 (1885)), although some cases acknowledge a
softer standard: "the ability to consent to the marriage contract in general, without tak-
ing into account the particular duties and the nature of the marriage relation." Id.
In addition, various state statutes define when a person is incompetent and therefore in
need of a guardian or conservator. These statutes generally fall into one of two catego-
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cades of trying, the best minds have failed to come up with a single test
ries: the older, traditional statutes, which tend to focus on the individual's mental status,
and the modem reform statutes, which take into account the individual's ability to func-
tion. The trend has been for legal incompetency determinations to be based on criteria
used in clinical evaluations. See Parry, supra, at 371.
The Indiana statute exemplifies the traditional status test:
"Incapacitated person" means an individual who... is unable: (A) To manage
in whole or in part the individual's property; (B) To provide self-care; or (C)
Both; because of insanity, mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness, in-
firmity, habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, incarceration, confine-
ment, detention, duress, fraud, undue influence of others on the individual, or
other incapacity ....
Ind. Code Ann. § 29-3-1-7.5 (Burns 1989 & Supp. 1993). A guardian must be appointed
for an incapacitated person if the court finds such appointment necessary to provide care
and supervision over the incapacitated person or his or her property. See id. § 29-3-5-3.
The Florida statute exemplifies the ability-to-function test:
"Incapacitated person" means a person who has been judicially determined to
lack the capacity to manage at least some of the property or to meet at least
some of the essential health and safety requirement of the person. (a) To "man-
age property" means to take those actions necessary to obtain, administer, and
dispose of real and personal property, intangible property, business property,
benefits, and income. (b) To "meet essential requirements for health or safety"
means to take those actions necessary to provide the health care, food, shelter,
clothing, personal hygiene, or other care without which serious and imminent
physical injury or illness is more likely than not to occur.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.102(10) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
The Uniform Probate Code retains the status aspects of the traditional tests, yet also
focuses on the person's functional abilities. It provides that an "incapacitated person" is
"any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical ill-
ness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except mi-
nority) to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions." Unif. Prob. Code § 5-103(7), 8 U.L.A. 276 (Supp.
1993).
Proposals for statutory legal standards for determining incompetency or incapacity
have also been made. Professor Barnes suggests that
[a] person subject to the court should be one who, because of mental illness,
developmental disability, addiction to drugs or alcohol, or other mental disor-
der, is incapable of understanding and evaluating information essential to mak-
ing or communicating decisions necessary in order independently to secure
food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, or to manage property or financial
affairs.
Alison P. Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation ofAutonomy and Benef-
icence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 Emory LJ. 633,
755 (1992). Stephen Anderer argues that for a proposed ward to be adjudged incapaci-
tated, he or she must (1) be functionally unable, wholly or partially, to care for self or
property, (2) be unable, wholly or partially, to make or communicate decisions regarding
care for self or property, and (3) suffer from a demonstrated disorder or disability which
causes the ability to make or communicate decisions to be impaired. See Stephen J.
Anderer, A Model for Determining Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, Med. &
Physical Disability Legal Res. Services & Databases, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 107, 108. The
ABA commissions on the Mentally Disabled and on Legal Problems of the Elderly sug-
gest that
a finding of incapacity should be supported by evidence of functional impair-
ment over time; ... [and] include a determination that the person is likely to
suffer substantial harm by reason of an inability to provide adequate personal
care or management of property or financial affairs;... [but] age, eccentricity,
poverty or medical diagnosis alone should not be sufficient ....
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that seems both fair and workable to most of those concerned with the
problem. If one considers this "test seeking" phenomenon-which some
have dubbed the "search for [the] Holy Grail"'° 2-in light of the diag-
nostic complexity discussed in connection with the second premise, it is
reasonable to conclude that, "[h]aving no fixed meaning, the term 'in-
competency' is vague, inherently susceptible to misdiagnosis, and impos-
sible to objectify so that the decisionmaker's views of appropriate
behavior are utterly eliminated from the fact-finding process."' 10 3
Although it may not be provable, the cumulative effect of the circum-
stantial evidence discussed in this phase of the Article, together with the
test-seeking spectacle just described, suggests the supportability of my
fifth working premise, viz., that efforts to cabin the elusive and unruly
competency concept and to make it work for us in solving real life
problems have produced only greater confusion.
To summarize, an accurate determination of incompetency, partial or
otherwise, involves much more than simply chatting with the client or
patient for several minutes or even several hours. Determinations, how-
ever made, of partial or total incapacity with respect to older individuals,
have not routinely been used to trigger remedial action to reverse, cor-
rect, arrest, or to compensate for the cause of the apparent deficiency.
The tendency has been to simply take over the supposedly impaired per-
son's decision-making function without also providing the kind of assist-
ance that will help the individual function better."° Far too often, the
various formal and informal methods of surrogate decision-making and
management (conservatorship, guardianship, de facto guardianship, and
decision-making by family members) have been used as mechanisms for
extracting the imprimatur of consent from persons suspected of impair-
ment for the convenience of others or for the benefit of governmental
An Agenda for Reform, supra note 74, at 15.
Professor Luban, speaking of incompetency generally, suggests that if a person "can
give us an account of his reasons [for following an obviously disadvantageous path], then
we should dismiss the hypothesis of incompetence ...." Luban, supra note 7, at 477.
However, he also explains that "a boundary [should] be drawn, separating unacceptable
from acceptable bad reasons for a preference." Id. at 478 (emphasis added). If a reason
"is accepted by a group and therefore more than the product of an individual's idiosyn-
crasy," it should be accepted. Id. at 479. But if the reason is "peculiar to the individual,"
we must ask whether there is "any process going on in the person's head that can be
called 'inference from real facts,' [and if there is,] then the person is competent. It is too
much to require that the inference be valid, or objective, or correct, for that is more than
competent people can manage." Id.
102. Loren H. Roth, M.D., et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
Am. J. Psychiatry 279, 283 (1977).
103. Rein, supra note 39, at 1839. See generally Thomas G. Gutheil, M.D. & Paul S.
Appelbaum, M.D., Clinical Handbook of Psychiatry and the Law 218-24 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing legal efforts to define competency in the context of guardianships and the
resulting reliance on vague and overbroad descriptions); Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions"
to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Med-
ical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 413, 439-53 (discussing the incompetency excep-
tion to the requirement of informed consent for medical treatment).
104. See infra text accompanying note 109.
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agencies, hospitals doctors, lawyers, miscellaneous institutions, family
members, and other individuals.10 5 For the competency construct to
work fairly, society would have to commit whatever resources it takes:
1) to pay for state-of-the-art diagnoses and psychiatric workups before
any decisions are made regarding partial or total incapacity; 106 and 2) to
pay for whatever remedial action it takes (medical, environmental, nutri-
tional, and psychiatric) to reverse, correct, arrest, or to compensate for
the causes of the individual's malfunctioning if total or partial surrogate
decision making is sanctioned (however that occurs). This would also
require resources for follow-up procedures to ensure that informal or ap-
pointed surrogates arrange appropriate therapies.' 0 7 Follow-up proce-
dures should also be required as well as frequent reassessment and swift
105. See George J. Alexander, Writing a Living Will: Using a Durable Power of At-
torney 12-13 (1988); Rein, supra note 39, at 1826-33.
106. Florida's reform limited guardianship statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.331 (West
1986 & Supp. 1994), is superior in this regard to most guardianship statutes in that it
requires that state-of-the-art diagnoses and workups precede assessments of competency.
As Professor Barnes reports,
Expert evidence of disability is provided [under Florida's statute] by a three
member examining committee that must include a psychiatrist or other physi-
cian as well as other experts who can provide information necessary for an ac-
curate determination. One member of the examining committee must have
knowledge of the alleged area of disability.
In determining competency, the court must consider a report based on an
examination by the committee members that includes results of a physical ex-
amination, a mental health examination, and a functional assessment. The re-
port must provide a diagnosis, a prognosis, and a recommended course of
treatment. It must also provide an evaluation of the person's ability to exercise
rights such as the right to manage property, to determine residence, to consent
to medical treatment, and to make decisions affecting the social environment.
The report must also describe any matters in which the person lacks capacity,
explain the extent of incapacity, and give the factual basis for the determination.
Barnes, supra note 101, at 654-55 (footnotes omitted).
Since "many elderly people are aware of the severe repercussions of any inquiries into
their mental health, many older clients will be unwilling to ... undergo a medical exami-
nation at the lawyer's request." Murphy, supra note 45, at 913. To obviate this concern,
any such workup might have to be separated from the fact-finding process in competency
determinations. This would involve enacting procedural and evidentiary rules to prohibit
the use of information gained in connection with such diagnoses and workups as a basis
for bringing a petition or as evidence of incompetency in any formal inquiry. See infra
notes 187-209 and accompanying text.
107. A discussion of whether such programs should be means tested and what the
appropriate threshold for assistance might be is beyond the scope of this Article. Since I
do not see on the horizon the political will needed to enact such programs, this Article
suggests a different approach along the lines suggested in parts I and IV.
It is interesting to note that Florida's reform statute seeks to accomplish these goals by
requiring the petitioner to submit a guardianship plan which includes
(a) The provision of medical, mental, or personal care services for the welfare
of the ward; (b) The provision of social and personal services for the welfare of
the ward; (c) The place and kind of residential setting best suited for the needs
of the ward, (d) The application of health and accident insurance and any other
private or governmental benefits to which the ward may be entitled to meet any
part of the costs of medical, mental health, or related services provided to the
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termination of surrogate decision-making upon a finding that the individ-
ual is again decisionally capable.108
The point of requiring diagnoses, as suggested above,"° would not be
so much to obtain a physician's opinion regarding the client's compe-
tency as to see if the diagnosis can uncover correctable or reversible
causes of the client's problem. I say this because relying on a physician's
opinion regarding competency can sometimes be dangerous considering
the tendency of some medical professionals to believe that anything that
can be labelled, cured, or corrected is a disease or abnormal state. Doing
it right would cost a great deal of money at a time when there is fierce
competition for, and intergenerational conflict over, the nation's re-
sources. If society is unable or unwilling to spend the money needed to
make the parens patriae competency construct routinely and reliably
work the right way, then perhaps society in general-and our legal sys-
tem in particular-should, whenever possible, abandon or limit the con-
struct and try a different approach.
III. MODEL RULE 1.14: WITHIN THE COMPETENCY CONSTRUCT
Attention to the working, or the possible working, of any institution or
principle may well give us insight into weaknesses which remain con-
cealed so long as it is posed in sufficiently abstract terms. 11o
A. General Observations
Model Rule 1.14 suffers from at least four fundamental and interre-
lated flaws. One flaw, already discussed, 1" is the Rule's excessive focus
on the question of competency when the real problems in many cases
involving elderly clients and their loved ones are likely to be issues of
increased physical and emotional dependence and the need to find com-
mon ground, to compromise, and to accommodate competing interper-
sonal and societal interests.
ward; and (e) Any physical and mental examinations necessary to determine the
ward's medical and mental health treatment needs.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.363(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). The statute also requires annual
reporting by the guardian and judicial review of the report to determine the "appropriate-
ness and extent" of the guardianship and whether a change of plan or restoration of
certain powers is warranted by the current situation. See id. §§ 744.367-.372, 744.3735.
Only time will tell whether the Florida judiciary has sufficient desire, staffing, and other
resources to put teeth into these requirements.
108. See id. §§ 744.367-.372.
109. See supra text accompanying note 104.
110. Phillip Devine, The Ethics of Homicide 188 (1978). Although the quoted state-
ment was made in the context of the law having "something to say to philosophers," id.,
it seems equally apropos to practicing lawyers having something to say to the legal struc-
ture in general and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in particular. I am indebted
to Professor Yale Kamisar for bringing Professor Devine's comment to my attention. See
Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23 Hastings Center
Rep. 32, 38 (May-June 1993).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
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Second, Model Rule 1.14 fails to reveal its assumptions regarding the
basis of the attorney-client relationship. As noted in a paper prepared by
Professor John Donaldson, the Model Rules do not "define the circum-
stances required to create an attorney-client relationship.""' 2 Instead,
the introductory Scope portion of the Rules "cryptically states that
'whether a client-attorney relationship exists for any specific purpose can
depend on circumstances and may be a question of fact.' ,,"3 Absent any
statement to the contrary, most commentators" 14 (including myself) have
assumed that the rules must contemplate the principal-agent explanation
of the attorney's authority to act. This usually presupposes that the at-
torney acts as agent for one individual or entity' 5 or that, in cases of
consensual multiple representation, the lawyer will direct one or more
clients to find another attorney when potential conflict between clients
becomes a reality.' 1 6 A corollary assumption is that the lawyer, bound
by her duty of loyalty to the specific client, advocates her client's rights
to the exclusion of the rights or legitimate interests of others. "7
112. John E. Donaldson, Ethical Considerations in Advising and Representing the
Elderly 10 (undated) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
113. Id
114. Sea eg., Allee, supra note 54, at 38 (arguing that the Model Rules are based on
the "fundamental rule that the client, as principal .... makes all material decisions");
Devine, supra note 54, at 513 (describing the client-lawyer relationship as a "mutual
agency, with both lawyer and client each serving as both principal and agent"); Smith,
supra note 9, at 81-82 (observing that the Model Rules are consistent with "viewing the
attorney as agent and the client as principal").
115. See, eg., Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (1978) ("In our legal system, an
attorney is [the] client's agent and representative .... "); Allee, supra note 54, at 38
(assuming that "the client-lawyer relationship is basically one of a modified or expanded
agency relationship"); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 20-21 (1957) (explain-
ing that an incompetent principal lacks authority to empower his agent).
116. According to the Model Rules, the lawyer may not be able to continue represent-
ing any of the clients. Model Rule 1.7, which prohibits conflicts of interest, is implicated
when a lawyer has been representing two clients whose interests have become conflicting.
Model Rule 1.7(b) allows the lawyer to represent clients with potentially conflicting inter-
ests, but only so long as she "reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected." Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.7(b)(1). Once the lawyer becomes aware
of circumstances that result in the "material limitation" of her representation of a client,
she must withdraw from that representation pursuant to Rule 1.16. "Whether the lawyer
may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9." Id. cmt. 2. If
the lawyer had been representing the two clients in the "same or a substantially related
matter" and the lawyer realizes the interests of the two have become "materially ad-
verse," then she cannot continue to represent any of the clients. Id. Rule 1.9(a).
117. The lawyer is conventionally seen as a professional
devoted to his client's interests and is authorized, if not in fact required, to do
some things (though not anything) for that client which he would not do for
himself.
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend" The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tion, 85 Yale L. J. 1060, 1060 (1976) (emphasis added). The implications of this appear
more fully from Lord Brougham's description of the lawyer's role in connection with his
defense of Queen Caroline:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and ex-
pedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to
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But not all jurists have universally subscribed to this assumption. On
one occasion, for example, Justice Louis Brandeis "refused to identify an
individual client. Instead, he identified his client as 'the situation.' ""1
The assumptions behind the classical liberal agency theory of representa-
tion are facing increasing challenges from more contemporary commen-
tators.119 In the context of representing seriously ill clients with families,
Professor Watson sees the client as "the family."' 120 He concludes that
"as professionals,.. . we should not begin by analyzing conflicting rights
and interests and pondering whose interests should trump whose.
Rather, we need to rethink the deeper purpose of client representa-
tion." '121 The whole mediation movement may be seen as representing
another, perhaps unspoken, challenge to an individual rights approach to
representation. Indeed, mediation mechanisms and techniques may ulti-
mately provide a structure for dealing with the practical and ethical di-
lemmas addressed in this Article.
A third flaw is that the rule does not even acknowledge how compli-
cated the ethical and practical problems confronting the attorney really
are. Without acknowledgment, there can be no real guidance and there
is none. The rule places additional burdens on the lawyer even though
there are no mechanisms either within the Model Rules or within the
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on
reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.
Id. (quoting 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821). See also Michael D.
Bayles, Professional Ethics 95-96 (1981) (discussing the adversary system rationale for
the traditional ethics of the legal profession and lawyers' failure to recognize obligations
to third parties).
118. Sidney D. Watson, When Parents Die: A Response to Before Guardianship: Abuse
of Patient Rights Behind Closed Doors, 41 Emory L.J. 863, 871 (1992) (citing Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 963, 980 (1987)).
The context in which Professor Watson quotes this reference to Justice Brandeis appears
below.
What I have offered here as the appropriate role for the lawyer may seem radi-
cal, but if it is, it is only because of our recent preoccupation as a profession
with liberal assumptions. The role I propose is not new in our profession. It is,
instead, more like a return to our recent past. For example, Justice Louis Bran-
deis suggested just such a role for lawyers. Brandeis considered the client to be
the family and the role of the lawyer to search for the harmony of the family.
Brandeis first used these terms during the Senate hearings on his nomination to
the Supreme Court. He defended himself against a charge that his representa-
tion of a family business during a bankruptcy hearing demonstrated that he did
not know who his client was because he had violated the norm that a lawyer
represents only individuals, except in extraordinary situations. Brandeis re-
fused to identify an individual client. Instead he identified his client as "the
situation".
Id. at 870-71 (citations omitted).
119. See Watson, supra note 118.
120. Id. at 864.
121. Id. at 871.
BEYOND THE COMPETENCY CONSTRUCT
general legal system's procedural or evidentiary rules to authorize, let
alone support, the lawyer in meeting these burdens. For example, how
can a lawyer seek appointment of a guardian, as permitted by Rule
1.14(b), without revealing information obtained in the course of the rep-
resentation, in violation of Rule 1.6? Would this also implicate Rule
1.16, which requires a lawyer to "withdraw ... if... the representation
will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct . .. .,?
How can the attorney, saddled with the responsibility of determining
competency at several junctures, 23 "seek guidance from an appropriate
diagnostician"' 24 under Comment 5 to Rule 1.14 without the authoriza-
tion or funds to do so?
The fourth flaw, which clearly relates to the third, is that Rule 1.14
fails to explain exactly what authorizes the attorney to take certain ac-
tions expressly or impliedly permitted under the rule as fleshed out by
the comments. What theory, for example, authorizes the attorney to act
as defacto guardian as suggested by Comment 2? There is also no recog-
nition that following the permissive directions of Rule 1.14 could poten-
tially expose the hapless attorney to disciplinary sanctions under other
rules with mandatory standards. 25 These deficiencies reflect a general
unwillingness to confront the hard issues, relying instead on aspirational
generalities. Although this denial instinct is understandable, given the
number and complexity of the issues and the fact that our present legal
system does not support other approaches, it only increases the confusion
and leaves the lawyer without guidance and exposed to disciplinary sanc-
tions or malpractice claims whichever way she turns.
Although I offer some specific suggestions in this Part, a mere tinker-
ing with the Model Rules will not remove the basic problems. Because
the concerns of the elderly require such an interdisciplinary approach
and because the problems are so complex, no ethics code for representa-
tion of the elderly can work in a vacuum. The workability of some sug-
gestions will therefore require corresponding changes in evidentiary
rules, the rules of procedure, the ethics codes of other professional
groups, and, perhaps, substantive rules regarding capacity to make con-
tracts and gifts. Indeed, addressing the real issues in their full scope and
122. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.16(a).
123. See discussion supra notes 17-22.
124. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14 cmt. 5.
125. See eg., id. Rule 1.2(a) (requiring consultation with the client as to the means
used in attaining the objectives of the representation); id. Rule 1.4(a) (requiring the law-
yer to "keep [her] client reasonably informed about the status of a matter); id. Rule 1.4(b)
(requiring the lawyer to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation"); id. Rule 1.7(b)
(prohibiting a lawyer from "represent[ing] a client if the representation ... may be mate-
rially limited by ... the lawyer's own interests," unless the client "consents after consul-
tation"); id. Rule 1.6 (prohibiting revelation of information relating to the representation
except under limited circumstances); id. 1.8(b) (prohibiting the lawyer from "us(ing] in-
formation relating to [the] representation.. . to the disadvantage of the client unless the
client consents after consultation").
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complexity will require nothing less than a total rethinking of our as-
sumptions regarding the basis of the attorney-client relationship (at least
in the nonlitigation context) and the benefits of individualism versus a
more community-oriented approach of mediation and accommodation.
As presently structured, the Model Rules are largely designed for repre-
sentation in a litigation setting. This design and its underlying assump-
tions may be ill-suited for dealing with many of the problems
practitioners face when representing the elderly client. This is not to say
that there is no room for strict adversarial advocacy when appropriate or
use of the competency construct when unavoidable, but only that other
approaches and options should be made available to the attorney when
the situation calls for them.
B. A Critical Tour of the Model Rules
Because the legal literature contains so many helpful treatments of the
ethics rules and opinions governing the attorney's responsibilities vis-a-
vis the questionably competent client,126 no detailed analysis is attempted
here. My goal is to identify the problem areas sufficiently to suggest ave-
nues to explore for possible improvement within the present structure.
Even as so confined, however, these suggestions will require correspond-
ing changes that extend beyond the Model Rules themselves. Moreover,
because of the complexity and intractability of the problems, most sug-
gestions will necessarily be preliminary and imperfect.
1. Rule 1.14's Ambivalence About the Basis of the Attorney-Client
Relationship
In line with the individualistic, principal-agent basis of the attorney-
client relationship, Model Rule 1.2(a) requires the attorney to "abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation'" 27
within the limits of the Model Rules, provided no criminal or fraudulent
conduct is involved. Comment 1 cautions the lawyer to "defer to the
client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern
for third persons who might be adversely affected."' 2 8 This discourages
the lawyer from concerning herself with, much less mediating between,
the client and connected persons with legitimate competing concerns.
Comment 2 refers the attorney for the questionably competent client to
Model Rule 1.14 for guidance regarding her "duty to abide by the client's
decisions .... ,,12' Rule 1.14(a) says that the lawyer "shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with
126. See authorities cited supra note 11; Allee, supra note 54; Devine, supra note 54; 1
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.14:100-303 (2d ed. Supp. 1993); Murphy,
supra note 45.
127. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.2(a).
128. Id. Rule 1.2(a) cmt. 1.
129. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 2.
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the client,"' 131 which thereby implicates the duty to communicate with
the client,' the duty of loyalty, 132 and the duty to keep client
confidences. 1
33
So far in the analysis, the attorney-client relationship is based on
agency principles.' 34 The client is the boss and the attorney carries out
his stated wishes within limits already mentioned. This assumes "the
client is a competent adult capable of rational [whatever that means] de-
cision-making regarding those matters in connection with the representa-
tion ... . Under the agency theory, if someone's mental impairment
is so severe as to prevent "the formation or continuance of the client-
lawyer relationship, a lawyer has no authority to act for the client, and
the lawyer who continues [the representation] may be subjected to per-
sonal liability."' 36 Presumably the lawyer's choices here are to refuse to
represent the client, to withdraw from the representation or to seek the
appointment of a guardian.' 37 If appointed, the guardian essentially be-
comes the principal in the attorney-client relationship. 38 The lawyer
may become duty bound, however, to "blow the whistle" on her princi-
pal if the guardian abuses its trust vis-a-vis the ward.' 39
130. Rule 1.14 provides:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in con-
nection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority,
mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably
possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protec-
tive action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably believes
that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.
Id. Rule 1.14.
131. L Rule 1.4.
132. The Model Rules implicating the duty of loyalty include Rule 1.7 (general rule
regarding conflict of interest), Rule 1.8 (prohibited transactions), Rule 1.9 (former client),
and 1.10 (imputed disqualification).
133. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6.
134. See, eg., Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1978) ("In our legal system,
an attorney is [the] client's agent and representative .... ").
135. Allee, supra note 54, at 38 (emphasis and editorial comment added).
136. Id. See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 122 (explaining that the incapac-
ity of the principal generally terminates the agent's authority).
137. I do not consider refusal to represent or withdrawal as options here for reasons
explored infra note 210-15 and accompanying text (discussing the withdrawal option).
138. Professors Hazard and Hodes suggest that
[iut may be appropriate to think of the guardianas the primary client and the
disabled person as the derivative client, rather than the other way around. In
the guardian, the lawyer finds a person with whom she can communicate fully.
More importantly, the position of the guardian is such that what she wants
from the lawyer is normally deemed to be what the disabled person wants as
well. The lawyer therefore can follow the guardian's instructions, secure in the
knowledge that she is also being of service to the disabled person. The burden
of determining what is in the best interests of the disabled person is lifted from
the lawyer's shoulders, freeing her to perform more traditional lawyer tasks.
Hazard & Hodes, supra note 126, § 1.14:102, at 440.1.
139. But Professors Hazard and Hodes note that
[a]s in all cases of derivative clients, however, the lawyer must be alert to the
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Between subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 1.14, however, the assump-
tions make an unannounced turn that leaves the lawyer representing the
client without any recognized basis for doing so. Rule 1.14(b) says "a
lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective
action ... only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client can-
not adequately act in the client's own interest."' 141 It does not say she
must do so. Presumably, then, the lawyer can continue to represent the
client even though that client cannot adequately represent his own inter-
ests (whatever that means). On what basis does that representation con-
tinue if the client is incompetent to represent his own interests? Rule
1.14 doesn't say. For example, Comment 3 says "the lawyer should see
to such an appointment where it would serve the client's best interests"
but, recognizing that this course may prove "expensive or traumatic for
the client," leaves the decision to "the professional judgment" of the
lawyer. 141
The rule does not state which of the many tests and medical models for
determining competency 41 the lawyer should use in exercising this judg-
ment. It offers no clue about how to determine task-specific, partial, or
intermittent incapacity, nor does it acknowledge what an unrealistic ex-
pectation it places on lawyers. As Professor Allee remarked,
"[d]etermining competency is difficult for medical and behavioral ex-
"1143perts, much less for lawyers ....
Where does this leave the lawyer? Suppose she manages somehow to
determine that her client "cannot adequately act in [his] own interest."
Presumably she must either seek imposition of a guardianship or conser-
vatorship with all the human suffering and problems of loyalty and confi-
dentiality that route may entail,' 44 "[r]ely on next of kin as proxy
decisionmaker,"'' 45 or act as defacto guardian as Comment 2 suggests.
Whatever the substantive merits or demerits of seeking proxy consent
possibility that the guardian is abusing her position. If the lawyer becomes con-
vinced that the guardian is acting contrary to the ward's best interests (espe-
cially if the conduct,is to the guardian's personal advantage), the lawyer may
have a duty to refuse instructions from the guardian, and even to take interdict-
ing action.
Id. at 440.1-41.
140. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14(b) (emphasis added).
141. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
142. See supra note 101 (discussing the many tests which exist for determining
competency).
143. Allee, supra note 54, at 39. See also discussion supra notes 68-82 and accompany-
ing text. If Rule 1.14 puts this impossible burden on the attorney, it should at least
suggest what tests and standards might be used in making the determination. In addi-
tion, any attempt to seek help from a diagnostician, as Comment 5 suggests, will clash
with Rule 1.6's mandatory duty of confidentiality. See infra notes 178-209 and accompa-
nying text.
144. See discussion infra notes 178-209 and accompanying text.
145. This is one of six lawyer responses to hypothetical situations listed by Professor
Tremblay, supra note 11, at 553. This citation does not suggest that Professor Tremblay
would approve of the response listed.
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from a family member or acting as defacto guardian may be, I do not see
any currently recognized basis for the representation in either case. "[In
many jurisdictions the family has absolutely no lawful authority to give
consent."' 4  With respect to defacto guardianship, if the client lacks the
competence to make decisions in a given sphere, he cannot be a principal
and his lawyer (the agent) lacks authority to act within that sphere.'47 In
this case, Professors Hazard and Hodes suggest, by analogy to Rule
1.13's entity representation, that the client (principal) is "an abstrac-
tion" '148 called "'the best interests' of her client."' 49 Although this ex-
planation of the authority to act for a mentally disabled client may be a
fruitful one to explore, it is not currently supported by the language of
Rule 1.14 itself. Any redraft of Rule 1.14 should explicitly state its the-
ory of the basis for the lawyer's authority to act when the client cannot
act as principal and no legal representative has been appointed."t S Any-
thing less than an explicit statement unfairly leaves the lawyer without
lawful authority to begin or continue the representation and exposes her
to both disciplinary action and personal liability.
The American College of Trust and Estates Counsel (ACTEC) com-
mentary on Model Rule 1.14 states:
The lawyer for a client who appears to be disabled may have implied
146. Id at 569 (citing President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 3 Making Health Care Decisions:
The Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient Practitioner Rela-
tionship 206-45 (1982)); see also Susan K. Gauvey et al., Informed and Substitute Con-
sent to Health Care Procedures: A Proposal for State Legislation, 15 Harv. J. on Legis.
431, 449 (1978) (observing that a substantial minority of states "allow certain relatives to
provide consent in specified circumstances") (footnote omitted); Paul B. Solnick, M.D.,
Proxy Consent for Incompetent Non-Terminally Ill Adult Patients, 6 J. Legal Med. 1, 19-
24 (1985) (opining that, although 19 states have statutes authorizing proxy decision mak-
ing, none adequately solves the issues raised in substitute decision making); Mark Fowler,
Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 985,
993-94 (1984) (family consent is not settled by statute or common law in at least 21
states).
147. Accord Tremblay, supra note 11, 574-75 (discussing the "broad version" of de
facto guardianship); cf Devine, supra note 54, at 513 ("One of the greatest weaknesses of
the Model Code is its failure to consider that the entire basis of the attorney-client rela-
tionship may be flawed by the existence of a disability preventing the effectivc creation of
an agency.").
148. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 126, § 1.14:102, at 440.
149. Id. § 1.14:301, at 447. The State Bar of Michigan, Committee on Professional
and Judicial Ethics, appears to support the view of Professors Hazard and Hodes by
stating that an attorney representing a workers' compensation claimant may refuse the
client's request to withdraw the claim "if, in [the lawyer's] professional judgment, with-
drawal would not advance the best interests of his client and the lawyer has serious
doubts about the mental stability and competency of his client." State Bar of Mich.,
Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-1055 (1984). Although this opinion
may be defensible on normative grounds, it is difficult to find a basis in Rule 1.14's lan-
guage for such continued representation against the client's stated wishes.
150. I have already mentioned several avenues to explore in searching for an alterna-
tive explanation for the attorney's authority to act, see supra notes 118-21 and accompa-
nying text, and will return to the subject infra part IV.
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authority to make disclosures and take actions that the lawyer reason-
ably believes are in accordance with the client's wishes that were
clearly stated during his or her competency. If the client's wishes were
not clearly expressed during competency, the lawyer may make disclo-
sures and take such actions as the lawyer reasonably believes are in the
client's best interests. It is not improper for the lawyer to take actions
on behalf of an apparently disabled client that the lawyer reasonably
believes are in the best interests of the client.' 5
Although there are obvious dangers inherent in giving one unsupervised
attorney such broad and open-ended implied authority, if this is the true
intent behind Model Rule 1.14, the Rule should be amended to so state.
Whatever the merits or demerits of ACTEC's implied authority con-
cept, it does not work when the attorney has no preexisting relationship
with an individual who clearly needs legal help but appears confused or
seems otherwise unable to enter into an agency relationship with the at-
torney. By analogy to the emergency doctrine for medical consent, the
Capacity Issues Working Group (hereafter "Working Group") of the
Conference on the Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients (hereaf-
ter "Conference") recommended that language allowing a lawyer to act
in an emergency situation "without express or implied agreement from
the purported client" be added as subsection (d) to Model Rule 1.14.52
151. American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, Commentaries on the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Oct. 18, 1993) [hereinafter ACTEC Commentaries].
152. The Conference Working Group adopted the following language:
I. A lawyer is an agent who acts upon the authority of a principal. In many
cases, the lawyer will have a pre-existing relationship with a person or that
person's family. In the absence of such a pre-existing relationship or a contrac-
tual agreement, express or implied, a lawyer generally may not act on behalf of
a client.
2. In certain circumstances, a lawyer may act as lawyer for a purported client
even without express or implied agreement from the purported client if:
a. An emergency situation exists in which the purported client's substantial
health, safety, financial, or liability interests are at stake;
b. The purported client, in the lawyer's good faith judgment, lacks the abil-
ity to make or express considered judgments about action required to be taken
because of an impairment of decision-making capacity;
c. Time is of the essence; and
d. The lawyer reasonably believes, in good faith, that no other lawyer is
available or willing to act on behalf of the purported client.
The lawyer may take those actions necessary to maintain the status quo or to
avoid irreversible harm even without express consent of the person.
3. A "purported client" is a person who has contact with a lawyer and who
would be a client but for the inability to enter into an expressed agreement.
[4. A lawyer who acts pursuant to this rule may not seek a fee for services
rendered in this capacity.]
Report of Working Group on Client Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1003, 1011-12 (1994).
Although adopted by the Working Group, paragraph 4 was voted down in the plenary
session because most conferees believed that the appropriateness of a fee in such cases
required further study. See id. at 1012.
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2. How Should the Lawyer Go About Determining Competency?
A threshold inquiry concerns the questionably competent lawyer.
Model Rule 1.1 states that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent represen-
tation[,]" which "requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."' 5 3 A lawyer
who is not qualified-by training or experience-to deal with the ques-
tionably competent client may, in some circumstances, have a duty to
refer the client to an attorney who is so qualified. The various state bar
associations might ameliorate this problem while promoting better legal
services for the questionably competent elderly by requiring that lawyers
who are likely to represent the elderly take a certain number of continu-
ing legal education or other special training courses designed to assist
them in providing such representation competently. These courses might
cover such topics as geriatric psychology, common physical impediments
to the ability to utilize existing mental capacity, the content and pitfalls
of legal standards that address competence, and the nature and availabil-
ity of community services to aid the elderly. Such training should also be
mandatory for judges who preside at competency determinations. Law-
yers could learn how to prepare papers (larger print) and to create office
environments (soft lighting, placement of furniture, elimination of dis-
tracting noises) that enhance their clients' ability to communicate. 54
As already noted, 5 ' Rule 1.14 offers no guidance regarding how the
competent lawyer should go about determining her client's competence
or degrees of competence except to suggest in Comment 5 that she "may
seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician."' 56 Professor Smith
suggests that "[w]henever doubts about the competence of a client's deci-
sion arise, the lawyer should look behind the perceived 'problem' to see if
the decision could be rational and informed.'" 7 She recommends engag-
ing the client in "a process of gradual decision-making which will involve
clarification, reflection, feedback, and further investigation."'58 During
this process, says Smith, the attorney "will need to consider her under-
standing of the client's values, the client's unique life circumstances, and
her own values and possible prejudices."' 59 The latter means the lawyer
should ask whether her doubts about the client's competence arise "be-
cause the client's values are different from her own."' 60
In applying this process to cases in which "the client's decision seems
odd or even harmful," Professor Smith advises the attorney to "consider
153. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.1.
154. For a discussion of these topics, see Smith, supra note 9, at 62-72; Frolik &
Barnes, supra note 13.
155. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
156. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14 cmt. 5.
157. Smith, supra note 9, at 90 (citations omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 91.
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what set of values could rationally lead to such a choice."' 16 1 Her illus-
trations are worth considering against the backdrop of current Rule 1.14,
for example
a young attorney may begin to doubt the competence of her elderly
client who does not wish to contest a right to income or benefits or
does not wish to take a relatively simple legal action to preserve his
assets. However, if the particular client has a limited life expectancy,
minimal need for assets, or an emotional focus upon internal or spiri-
tual things, that client's decision may be quite reasonable. Similarly,
the elderly client who acquiesces in a guardianship in order to accom-
modate a favorite child's need to care for him, may appropriately and
intelligently prefer this outcome to a dispute over his personal auton-
omy. At other times, the attorney may erroneously consider the client
incompetent because the client wants to retain assets rather than to
distribute them to his children in order to minimize estate taxes or to
achieve [M]edicaid eligibility. The attorney sees the decision as a
purely mechanical one of good estate planning. Yet the elderly client's
feelings about financial independence and about his relations with his
children are also relevant. If it is very important to the client to retain
control over his assets, then "poor" estate planning may be a compe-
tent decision for the client to make. Such decisions may seem eccen-
tric or harmful to the young ambitious attorney. However, she should
not question this client's competence without also examining her own
values and considering why those values may make certain client deci-
sions difficult for her to accept.' 62
Suppose the lawyer, using this approach, begins to understand her cli-
ent's point of view and decides to give her client the benefit of the doubt
on the competency question. If she decides the client's decision is a com-
petent one under the totality of the circumstances, including the client's
values, she will presumably forego the estate planning and perhaps even
abide by Martha's decision in my Hypothetical 2163 to refrain from re-
sisting the lawsuit or eviction action. The attorney may even arrange the
donation to the television evangelist or religious cult as Paul in my Hypo-
thetical 3164 desires. Should the client's relatives, or other parties includ-
ing the client himself, later successfully claim that the client was not
competent to make these decisions, the attorney could be subjected to
disciplinary action under the Model Rules as well as a malpractice or
other lawsuit seeking compensation for any losses incurred by the client
or third parties.
If Rule 1.14 is really serious about letting the lawyer's course of action
hinge entirely on the lawyer's answer to the competency question, then it
should protect the lawyer if she reasonably and in good faith makes what
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
1142 [Vol. 62
BEYOND THE COMPETENCY CONSTRUCT
turns out to be an erroneous determination of competency. Although the
suggested language may need refinement, the rule might read:
An attorney who defers to the articulated wishes of her client after
making a careful and reasonable determination that the client is com-
petent to make the decision in question, and after fulfilling her role as
advisor,165 will not, if the client is later deemed incompetent, be sub-ject to discipline, provided she acted in good faith and without person-
ally benefiting from the adopted course of action.1 66
This will not, however, protect the lawyer from malpractice and other
claims by her client or third parties. 167 Thus, complete protection for the
well-meaning lawyer who makes an honest and diligent judgment call in
favor of her client's autonomy would require a similar refinement or clar-
ification of substantive malpractice rules. The downside of this proposal
165. Model Rule 2.1 states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judg-
ment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.
Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 2.1. Comment 2 to Rule 2.1 states in part:
It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in
giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively
influence how the law will be applied.
Id Rule 2.1 cmt. 2. Comment 5 states:
In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client.
However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is
likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, duty to
the client under Rule 1.4 [Communication] may require that the lawyer act if
the client's course of action is related to the representation. A law~yer ordinarily
has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the
client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client
when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.
Id Rule 2.1 cmt. 5.
166. To encourage lawyers to "stay with the situation" without fear of discipline, the
Conference Working Group recommended that the following language be added as
Model Rule 1.14(c):
The lawyer should not be subject to professional discipline for invoking or fail-
ing to invoke the permissive conduct authorized by 1.14(b) if the lawyer has a
reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction.
See Report of Working Group, supra note 152, at 1007.
167. A composite complaint for malpractice written by Professors Frolik and Barnes
and "derived from a number of cases filed in the 1980's... illustrates the confusion that
reigns when conflicts within the family deteriorate into open hostility, and how hard
ethical questions can become a trap for the incautious attorney." Frolik & Barnes, supra
note 13, at 85.
The complaint, filed by the transferor's daughter, both individually and as the trans-
feror's daughter, alleged, inter alia, that the attorney, "at a time when he knew or should
have known that Annie Smith was incompetent, represented Annie Smith and assisted
her in transferring her major assets to Ian Holmes, whom [the attorney] also repre-
sented." Id at 86. Although the attorney clearly fell into the conflict of interest trap,
even if he had assisted Annie in transferring her assets to persons the attorney did not
also represent, it seems likely the daughter still would have sued him for arranging the
transfers at the behest of an incompetent client.
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is that the exculpatory rule suggested might allow an attorney to follow
her client's wishes without engaging in gradual counseling or seriously
considering the competency question, and then to claim protection under
the rule when there is no one available to dispute the attorney's assertion
of serious consideration and good faith. As stated earlier, there are no
perfect answers, especially when one starts with an oversimplified ques-
tion like whether or not the client was competent.
Another suggestion addresses the dilemma of the lawyer for a ques-
tionably competent client who faces a situation requiring immediate legal
action. Hypothetical 2,168 in which Martha refuses to sign an answer
prepared for her, comes to mind as an example. A lawyer faced with a
litigation deadline for taking defensive or offensive action needs "time
out" to assess the situation and to consider what to do next. The Model
Rules and corresponding procedural rules should provide some mecha-
nism allowing the lawyer to obtain such respite without having to raise
questions about her client's competency. She might, for example, request
an extension of time on the ground that her client is not yet prepared to
decide on a course of action. But a rule allowing lawyers to obtain exten-
sions without specifically showing justification might invite abuse. Per-
haps stiff sanctions for abuse might deter it, although abuse would be
hard to determine in most cases. Although Model Rule 1.14 might in-
corporate a suggestion that the lawyer seek "time out" in such situations,
making this option a reality would require changes in state procedural
rules. The Model Rules might achieve the same result by authorizing
attorneys to file temporary answers or complaints without specific client
authorization. Presumably the lawyer would be forced to withdraw the
temporary answer or complaint if, after extensive client consultation and
gradual counseling, she determined that her client had made a competent
decision to refrain from litigation.169
Because of my deep skepticism 7' about the usefulness of the compe-
tency construct as a divining rod for determining whether a lawyer
should abide by the client's articulated wishes, I hesitate to suggest which
of the many tests or models the Rules should incorporate for making
informal competency determinations. Lawyers are qualified to construct
models for recognizing, weighing, and striking a balance between com-
peting interests. They have been trained to do so since they first encoun-
tered the famous "Hand formula"' 1 in law school. But they are not in
any way trained to make competency determinations. Moreover,
whatever model or test for competency is used, each individual lawyer
will apply it through the lens of her own life experiences and values.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
169. For a discussion regarding how such a client-centered determination of compe-
tency might be formed and the possible consequences for the lawyer, see supra notes 157-
64; see also infra note 263 (the Working Group listed a "time out" as a protective action).
170. See discussion supra note 21 and accompanying text.
171. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Nothing in the current Model Rules or anywhere else ensures uniformity
of application, predictability of outcome, or accountability. There is no
process, other than fortuitous litigation, for scrutinizing the lawyer's in-
dividual determination of incompetency or competency and, in most in-
stances, the adverse repercussions of such a determination are not
discoverable until it is too late. It would, I suppose, be possible for each
community to appoint a panel of experts (eg., gerontologists, social
workers, psychologists) to assist lawyers in making informal competency
determinations, but the rules governing confidentiality and the profes-
sional independence of a lawyer would require modification to accommo-
date such practice.
While Professor Smith does not propose a substantive competency
test, I have great sympathy for her respectful, autonomy-preserving ap-
proach to the problem. There are, however, some concerns and practical
considerations not addressed by her approach. First, individuals, includ-
ing lawyers, vary markedly in their ability to set aside their assumptions
and perceptions of a situation and to entertain the possible validity of
other perspectives. Not all lawyers are as perceptive or as sensitive as
Professor Smith. Moreover, there are no objective factors in competency
determinations like probability, gravity of harm, or burden by which a
lawyer's application of law to the facts of his client's situation can be
reviewed.172 Variations in temperament and lack of objective criteria
combine to produce the lack of uniformity and lack of accountability
mentioned above. This is one reason I suggest we offer lawyers alterna-
tive approaches that rely less on the competency construct and more on
relatively objective criteria.
Second, the client may lack the funds or willingness to pay for the
number of billable hours the gradual counseling process takes. Further,
the lawyer may lack the time for such counseling, especially if the com-
petency question arises in a routine matter like a contracts dispute in-
volving a modest sum. This is not a criticism in the sense that I can offer
a solution which avoids the problem, but it is, nevertheless, a problem
worth thinking about. Finally, Professor Smith's approach does not take
into account how the client's decision, even if competently made when
viewed from the client's perspective and values, might adversely affect
the community and the rights of others who are unable to object because
they have no notice of the irreversible action. She does not address what
happens if, after all this gradual counseling and gentle persuasion, her
client insists on making an extremely selfish choice that forces others,
without prior consultation or notice, to give up their rights and scarce
resources to ensure the client's survival. This is no objection to those
who value individual autonomy to the exclusion of any other value in our
172. This is not to say that probability and other factors identified in the "Hand
formula" can be proved with anything approaching mathematical certainty, but such
factors are arguably more understandable in the lay sense than criteria such as "ability to
reason" or "factual comprehension."
1994] 1145
1146 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
society, or who assign such a disproportionately high value to autonomy
that the effect is the same. 173 But not everyone would weigh the compet-
ing values this way. 174 Moreover, such a view can tend to confuse infan-
tile caprice with autonomy.1 75 Some proponents of this view may also
fail to consider that a finding of incompetency under the competency
construct involves a much more permanent, complete, and unreviewable
stripping of autonomy than any attempt to ask an individual to adjust his
action to take into account the rights and legitimate interests of others. 176
An approach that includes consideration of others' values and interests
may be attacked on the ground that lawyers are not private attorneys
general-that it is not their proper function to bring competing societal
interests to bear on their clients' actions. This is undoubtedly the under-
lying premise of much of our system, including the Model Rules, so long
as the individual is deemed competent. But this premise can be ques-
tioned on normative grounds. 1 77 For now, suffice it to say that whether
we like it or not, lawyers serve as gatekeepers for society. If there is no
mechanism by which the gatekeepers can bring other voices to bear on
the problem, such voices will never be heard except in serpentine ways
until the often irreparable damage to the client and others has already
occurred. Moreover, when a lawyer or guardian pursues her own inter-
ests (i.e., fear of disciplinary sanctions or a malpractice suit) or society's
173. I do not suggest that Professor Smith holds this view.
174. See discussion supra note 50 and accompanying text.
This would not be the view of all cultural groups in America today. Even if we were to
assume, probably erroneously, that most Euro-Americans would hold this view, it is
worth noting that by the year 2000, Americans who are not of European decent will
account for 50% or more of California's population. See, e.g., Tony Bizjak, Capital's
Future? Growth Area Pegged As Decade's Population Hot Spot In State, Sacramento Bee,
Sept. 22, 1992, at B1 ("Eight out of 10 new Californians in the 1990s-both those born in
the state and immigrating to it-will be ethnic minorities . . . ."); Davan Maharaj, Inter
Ethnic Ills Loom, Leaders Say, Los Angeles Times, June 2, 1993, at BI ("There will be no
ethnic majority group in California by the year 2000."); Jeannie Wong, Latinos: Poverty
and Strong Work Ethic, Sacramento Bee, May 12, 1992, at Al 3 ("As California moves
close to the 21st century .... Latinos will make up about 33 percent of the population by
the year 2000."); Myrna Zambrano, Middle Class Values, Underclass Sociological Stand-
ing Stereotypes: Leaders would do well to understand poverty-plagued Latinos, who could
be California's largest minority by the year 2000, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 29, 1992, at BI
("In California, non-Anglos are projected to become the majority by the year 2000.");
State Job Outlook Called Healthy, San Jose Mercury News, Sept. 22, 1992, at AI ("His-
panic, Asian and African-American residents are expected to make up half of the state's
population in the year 2000 .... ); Study Sees No Letup In Growth Rise, Sacramento Bee,
May 28, 1990, at A3 ("[E]thnic minorities will add up to 50 percent of the state's popula-
tion by 2000 .... ).
175. Individuals must be allowed some degree of selfishness. I have no problem with a
lawyer's supporting her client's infantile caprice as long as it does not seriously invade the
rights, health, and welfare of others. To capriciously withhold a benefit like an inheri-
tance is one thing; to invade someone else's rights and resources by demanding a benefit
or acceptance of a detriment is quite another.
176. See discussion supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; infra notes 256-59 and
accompanying text.
177. See discussion supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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interests (Le., preventing unjust enrichment of the unscrupulous) using a
client's supposed incapacity as a rationale, she acts as an attorney for
herself or as a private attorney general under the cloak of the competency
construct. The question then becomes whether we wish to act as private
attorneys general indirectly via the competency construct or directly
through some broader, more principled approach.
3. Preliminary Clashes with Rule 1.6's Duty of Confidentiality, Rule
1.7's Duty of Loyalty, and Other Problems
Rule 1.14's comment 5 notes that most procedural rules require that
"persons suffering mental disability.., be represented by a guardian or
next friend if they do not have a general guardian." 7" It also notes that
disclosing the client's condition might raise the question of disability and
thus trigger "proceedings for involuntary commitment." '79 Comment 5
says "[t]he lawyer may seek guidance" in dealing with this "unavoidably
difficult" situation "from an appropriate diagnostician.' ' 10 Presumably
the purpose of this permissive statement is to allow lawyers to get help
from medical professionals in determining preliminarily whether or not
the client is so disabled as to require a representative. Additionally, com-
ment 2 states that "[i]f the [client] has no guardian or legal representa-
tive, the lawyer often must act as defacto guardian."'' If this concept of
de facto guardianship is broad or vague enough to allow the lawyer to
make major legal decisions for the client in both litigation and nonlitiga-
tion settings, 82 a diagnostician's aid might also be sought in connection
with the lawyer's decision whether to act as de facto guardian.
Regrettably, the Rules do not say who qualifies as a diagnostician, on
whose behalf the diagnosis is sought, who should pay for the diagnosis,
or how the diagnosis can be obtained without violating both the diagnos-
tician's and the lawyer's duties of confidentiality.' 83 A lawyer may wish
to consult with a variety of experts including physicians, nurses, physical
and speech therapists, gerontologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and
social workers. However,
the lawyer employing a member of one of these fields must know that,
should a third party later charge the lawyer with improperly represent-
ing an incompetent client, he can support his representation on the
basis that it followed a positive evaluation of the client's competency,
and that this evaluation was conducted by someone in a profession
recognized as qualified to make competency determinations. 1 4
178. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14 cmt. 5.
179. Id
180. Id.
181. Id cmt. 2.
182. Cf Tremblay, supra note 11, at 574 (discussing the broad and narrow views of de
facto authority).
183. Accord Allee, supra note 54, at 39; Murphy, supra note 45, at 911.
184. Murphy, supra note 45, at 917-18.
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The Model Rules' Terminology section should define who qualifies as a
diagnostician for the purpose of helping the lawyer determine whether
the client needs a formal representative and whether the lawyer should
act as defacto guardian. While such definitions would not be binding on
judicial application of malpractice rules, they might at least be indirectly
influential. Unfortunately, "[e]xaminations [in connection with guardi-
anship proceedings] reportedly have been performed by plastic surgeons,
gynecologists, and the petitioner, if performed at all." ' 5 The Terminol-
ogy section should therefore specify the credentials and experience re-
quired to qualify as a diagnostician within the contemplation of the
Rules.186 The Rules should also specify the circumstances under which
the lawyer may charge the cost of such diagnostic assistance to the client.
The biggest problem is that the search for diagnostic assistance will
likely put the attorney following Comment 5's permissive advice on a
collision course with the mandatory duties of confidentiality and loyalty
under Rules 1.6 and 1.7 respectively. Model Rule 1.6 forbids a lawyer
from "reveal[ing] information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation ... ." 187
This duty of confidentiality applies to all information relating to the rep-
resentation regardless of its source. Rule 1.8(b), which prohibits the use
of information detrimental to the client, potentially applies as well. 88
Rule 1.6(b) permits disclosure without client authorization under limited
circumstances that do not apply to the search for diagnostic
assistance. 18s9
Model Rule 1.7(b) provides in part that
[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless (1)
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation .... 190
185. Anderer, supra note 13, at 18 (endnotes omitted); see also Arnold J. Rossoff &
Gary L. Gottlieb, Preserving Personal Autonomy for the Elderly: Competency, Guardian-
ship and Alzheimer's Disease, 8 J. Legal Med. 1, 16 (1987) (noting the perfunctory nature
of mental capacity assessments performed by physicians).
186. The Florida Guardianship statute provides that, upon the filing of a petition for
guardianship, a three-member committee is to be appointed to examine the proposed
ward. The committee must be comprised of at least one psychiatrist or other physician.
In addition, another member of the committee must be a psychologist, a gerontologist, a
registered nurse, a nurse practitioner, a licensed social worker, or a second psychiatrist or
other physician. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.331(3)(a) (West 1994).
187. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6(a).
188. See id. Rule 1.8(b).
189. Disclosure is authorized "(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
... likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or (2)... to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client." Id.
Rule 1.6(b).
190. Id. Rule 1.7(b) (emphasis added).
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When a lawyer who wonders if her client is partially or wholly incompe-
tent consults a diagnostician, the lawyer arguably acts in her own interest
and on her own behalf to the extent that she seeks to avoid disciplinary
action or malpractice claims. It would be natural for a lawyer to believe
that the client's representation would not be adversely affected and this
belief might even be deemed reasonable. But this belief itself does not
suffice. Because of the conjunctive language of Rule 1.7(b)(1) and (2),
the client must also consent after consultation. Fearing19 the connec-
tion between inquiries into his cognitive or functional abilities and loss of
liberty, the client may very well refuse consent. In that case, technically
speaking, the lawyer may be required to withdraw pursuant to Model
Rule 1.16, which says that "a lawyer ... shall withdraw from the repre-
sentation of a client if... the representation will result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct ....,,92 But even if the client provides an
objective manifestation of consent, it is difficult to see how the lawyer can
rest comfortably on any assumption of its validity when doubts about the
client's competency triggered the search for diagnostic assistance in the
first place. The same problem arises if the lawyer seeks consent to disclo-
sure of confidential information under Rule 1.6.191 A lawyer's search for
diagnostic assistance may be further hampered by the fact that the physi-
cian, in turn, faces similar professional ethics restraints on her ability to
disclose confidential information regarding a patient.' 94 Cooperation be-
tween medical and legal professionals in making competency assessments
191. See infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
192. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.16(a)(I) (emphasis added).
193. Cf Murphy, supra note 45, at 915 ("It is therefore unclear whether a waiver of
confidentiality can be considered voluntary, competent and informed when the purpose of
the waiver is to obtain information relating to a client's possible incompetency."). Mr.
Murphy also writes:
If a lawyer requests that his client submit to a medical examination concerning
his mental well-being or that he release medical records pertaining to his mental
competency, all the elements of a valid waiver are in dispute. The lawyer who is
requesting a waiver due to questions he has concerning the mental capacity of
his client cannot, with any logical consistency, assert that the client was posi-
tively competent enough to abdicate a known right, since the lawyer's original
suspicion as to the client's ability to understand the nature of a legal transaction
motivated the waiver request. This very suspicion naturally brings into ques-
tion the client's ability to understand the right abdicated or the consequences of
the disclosure.
Id
194. Accord id at 913. Mr. Murphy writes:
Section 9 of the American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics
tells a physician that he cannot reveal confidential patient information unless
required by law or when necessary to protect the interests of the community or
the individual. However, state statutes change rapidly in this field, and the defi-
nition of what is "necessary to protect the interests of the community" changes
as the case law evolves. Although the American Medical Records Association
lists 12 categories and 24 instances in which patient information can be used
outside of medical treatment, competency determinations other than those for




will ultimately depend on the extent to which the drafters of the ethics
rules for each profession can themselves cooperate in developing an inter-
disciplinary approach to the problem.
Suggestions about relaxing the confidentiality barrier to permit cooper-
ation between lawyers and medical professionals must not lose sight of
the reason restrictions on the revelation of confidential information were
enacted in the first place. A client is unlikely to communicate fully and
frankly with his attorney (or his doctor) if the lawyer is free to reveal
information gained in the course of the representation.195
To appreciate the seriousness of the confidentiality problem in this
context, one must consider the frame of mind of the elderly client who
fears that inquiries into his mental health or functional abilities will even-
tually lead to guardianship and institutionalization. 96 As indicated ear-
lier, "'[g]uardianship in many ways is the most severe form of civil
deprivation which can be imposed on a citizen of the United States.' "197
Further, "[c]onservatorship and guardianship.., result in heavy, or even
a total, loss of autonomy. Enormous hostility is created within a family
if someone charges that a parent has become mentally incapacitated."' 98
Although limited guardianship is theoretically a promising reform, it has
not proved as promising in practice. This is because most judges do not
tailor guardianships and conservatorships to the specific needs and ca-
pacities of proposed wards, even when limited guardianship is available.
As Professor Barnes explains
The reform of guardianship statutes is failing in a number of juris-
dictions and in a number of different ways.... Insufficient funding, as
well as lack of understanding and resistance to change is a significant
problem because limited guardianship requires more time and effort on
the part of judges, court personnel, counsel, and parties.' 99
Moreover, "even if guardianship reform were fully implemented for
every mentally impaired elderly person, it would not create a system of
decision-making and care that fulfills its own goal of providing the least
restrictive form of assistance. ' 'z00
195. See Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 ("A fundamental principle in the
client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relat-
ing to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and
frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.").
196. Although an adjudication of incompetency is not the equivalent of institutional-
ization, the two are frequently treated together because the former so greatly increases
the risk of the latter.
197. Rein, supra note 39, at 1825 (quoting Abuses, supra note 69).
198. Peter J. Strauss, Elderlaw in the Nineties, 1 Elder L.J. 19, 22 (1993).
199. Barnes, supra note 101, at 648-49.
200. Id. at 649. As Professor Barnes explains:
Competency proceedings either result in the appointment of a plenary or lim-
ited guardian, or the impaired person receives no assistance or ongoing protec-
tion from authorities. Yet, permanent guardianship may not be the optimum
form of care. For many elderly impaired persons, a period of stabilization fol-
lowed by a reliable program of assistance from family and friends might provide
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Finally, no matter how much we reform our guardianship laws and
practices to ensure that the ward gets real help and that the guardian's
powers are appropriately limited, there is simply no way to completely
remove the stigmatization and loss of self worth caused by a finding of
total or partial incompetency or incapacity. As one ward lamented,
I cannot tell you how much worse my mental condition is since I have
been a "thing" of the court's without rights. I want to die. I pray to
die. There is no happiness in life-my life is over. I would prefer
death to living as a guardianship zombie the rest of my life.2 "
Small wonder, then, that most older individuals fear the imposition of
guardianship, especially a guardianship that gives the guardian the power
to change the ward's place of residence.
Even greater than the fear of guardianship is the fear of
institutionalization:
Our elders desperately want to remain in their own homes, stay out of
the nursing home, and keep their independence.... They do not view
the nursing home as a place to get better; they view it as a harbinger of
death-a dismal way station from which there is no escape but
death.202
Nursing homes are one of the most pervasive sources of later-life
anxiety:2 0
3
Even when care is considered adequate, older individuals may still
find little in the nursing home experience to reassure them: for exam-
ple, all too common is the image of residents whose days are spent
parked in front of droning televisions, unable to participate in deci-
sions about their own care and lacking in activities to keep them inter-
ested in daily life. 2°4
enough support to allow the individual to make decisions necessary for life in
the community. Often, the principal need is a change of housing, regular meals,
and companionship to effect a significant improvement in capabilites. In order
to make such services available under protective supervision, guardianship must
become part of a system of long term care decision-making options and support-
ive services. Otherwise, it is likely that guardianship will be overused through
imposition on competent persons who come to the court's attention, but need
only practical, not decision-making, assistance, and underused, in services ap-
propriate to their condition and needs, because they have no competent proxy
decision-maker. Guardianship reform, therefore, is a necessary step in cor-
recting the effects of ageism and providing appropriate rights to the disabled
elderly. Guardianship reform alone, however, is not sufficient.
Id at 649-50.
201. Jeffrey Good & Larry King, 7 Am Not a Criminal... ', St. Petersburg Times,
reprinted in Abuses, supra note 69, at 75.
202. Rein, supra note 39, at 1860-61.
203. See Paula J. Biedenharn, MA, & Janice B. Normoyle, PhD, Elderly Community
Residents' Reactions to the Nursing Home: An Analysis of Nursing Home-Related Beliefs,
31 Gerontologist 107 (1991).
204. Ia at 107 (citations omitted).
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How many of us have seen senior citizens in a nursing home-even a
"nice one"-waiting for someone, anyone, to visit them?
Although many things (including family and financial pressures on
persons needing long-term care) coerce people into institutions,20 5 the
imposition of guardianship removes a major impediment to the imposi-
tion of institutional care. Even if the guardian's powers are initially lim-
ited, guardianship is often the first step in a dreary march to the nursing
home. Not surprisingly, there is a great psychological connection in an
older person's mind between the institution of guardianship proceedings
and the imposition of institutional care. Moreover, this fear is well
founded because the candidate for guardianship does not know in ad-
vance whether and how the guardianship might be limited.
If confidentiality barriers are relaxed to permit interdisciplinary coop-
eration without installing safeguards to allay justified client fears, clients
may simply refuse to reveal what ails them to doctors or lawyers. What
can be done to allow the questionably competent client to get diagnostic
and therapeutic help without having to worry that the information the
lawyer gives to the doctor (or vice versa) will trigger unwanted interven-
tion, including guardianship proceedings and eventual institutionaliza-
tion? Three possible approaches, none of them perfect, suggest
themselves.
One approach, is for the lawyer to refrain from revealing the client's
identity. But a major drawback is that the expert's diagnosis will be lim-
ited by those facts the lawyer deems relevant and can disclose without
revealing her client's identity. In most cases, the lawyer could do little
more than describe her client's behavior, lifestyle, eating habits, and, per-
haps, medications. Such a hypothetical diagnosis does not permit the
diagnostician, through examination or further testing, to determine the
possibly correctable causes of the client's behavior. The hypothetical di-
agnosis will not, therefore, provide a platform for obtaining medical
treatment to reverse, correct, or compensate for the treatable causes of
the client's dysfunction. Another drawback, common to all three ap-
proaches, is that the diagnostician's conclusions may inspire the lawyer
herself to bring about the institution of guardianship proceedings. This,
of course, is what the client probably feared in the first place. Whether
the lawyer should ever take this extreme step will be discussed below.20 6
Another way to minimize the dangers inherent in any relaxation of
confidentiality barriers might be to promulgate a rule prohibiting the use
of any information about the client's condition gained by anyone as a
result of lawyer-diagnostician cooperation from being used as a basis for,
205. Rein, supra note 39, at 1854-55. For example, "in the case of one spouse caring
for another, the Medicaid eligibility rules create compelling financial incentives for the
'well spouse' or 'community spouse' to institutionalize the impaired spouse before institu-
tionalization becomes necessary or even desirable in noneconomic terms." Id. at 1855
(citations omitted).
206. See infra text accompanying notes 227-49.
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or evidence of, incompetency in any subsequent proceeding. Again,
although the Model Rules might suggest such an approach by expanding
notions of privileged information, making the prohibition enforceable
would require changes in the rules of procedure and evidence regarding
proceedings for the imposition of conservatorship, guardianship, institu-
tionalization, and similar interventions.
A third approach, usable in conjunction with the second, might be to
promulgate a special ethics rule permitting elderlaw attorneys to associ-
ate with physicians, psychiatrists, gerontologists, psychologists, social
workers, nutritionists, and others in a multidisciplinary practice with the
environment and services most needed by older individuals provided
under one roof. Such a rule would have several benefits. It would ac-
knowledge that a monolithic, "one-size-fits-all" set of rules governing
professional behavior cannot address the very real, special needs of cer-
tain types of legal practice. It would allow the older client to obtain a
coordinated approach to his care and to receive many of the services he
needs under one roof so that he need not exhaust himself and others by
travelling here, there, and everywhere for help. It might also simplify
paperwork and save money. Finally, it would address, in a practical
way, the problem of getting diagnostic and therapeutic assistance to the
client without triggering the ill effects of relaxing confidentiality rules. If
all members of the diversified practice and their assistants were bound by
the same rules of confidentiality, there would be no leakage of confiden-
tial information outside the practice. Confidentiality could be main-
tained the same way that medium and large law firms maintain
confidentiality. More importantly, if diagnosis and therapy (i.e., counsel-
ing, drug monitoring, social assistance, nutritional and physical therapy)
were provided in a caring manner within the same practice, the need for
conservatorship, guardianship, or de facto guardianship might be com-
pletely obviated in many cases.
The need for a multidisciplinary approach to elderlaw problems is
gaining increased recognition. As Porter and Affeldt explain,
What is manifested as a legal problem often begins as a personal or
family problem. Resolution of the legal aspects may not alleviate the
psychological pain a client experiences. In addition, lawyers are not
traditionally trained-nor should they be-to counsel clients with psy-
chological problems. There are many other occupations that work
with the elderly that complement the work of attorneys, such as social
workers, psychologists, counselors and other therapists. Other profes-
sions are usually more experienced in dealing with the older person
who needs assistance in applying for entitlement benefits, planning for
disability or health care needs, or who is mourning the loss of a spouse.
The attorney is the one who is trained to follow through with legal-
related questions at administrative and judicial hearings, drawing up a
durable power of attorney, and advising on crucial issues such as
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spousal impoverishment.2 °7
The current rules of professional conduct present many obstacles to
law firm diversification.208 Any rule permitting diversification by
elderlaw attorneys should be carefully drafted to address legitimate con-
cerns about potentially conflicting loyalties, improper solicitation, and
improper use of information. Law firm diversification as a general prop-
osition has been the subject of heated debate with various proposals being
alternately installed and rescinded.20 9 Whatever may be the pros and
cons of law firm diversification generally (and I take no stand in that
battle here), diversification in the elderlaw context deserves careful
consideration.
4. What Can the Lawyer Do Within the Competency Construct if
She Believes Her Client Is Incompetent?
As already noted, 210 a lawyer who is not qualified-by training or ex-
perience-to deal with the questionably competent client may sometimes
have a duty to refer the client to an attorney who is so qualified. In
situations that do not fall within this category, the lawyer may be
tempted to refuse a case or to withdraw from an existing attorney-client
relationship. Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) requires a lawyer to decline or ter-
minate representation "if... the representation will result in violation of
207. Porter & Affeldt, Legal Services Delivery Systems: An Overview of the Present and
a Look at the Future, in Aging and the Law: Looking into the Next Century (AARP
1990). I am indebted to Professors Frolik and Barnes for bringing this source to my
attention.
The Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct currently permit lawyers to asso-
ciate professionally with nonlawyers, albeit with restrictions. It provides:
A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the or-
ganization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal
services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial inter-
est undertake to abide by these rules of professional conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer par-
ticipants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under
Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(b) (1990).
208. For a discussion of the Model Rules which hinder law firm diversification, see
Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversifica-
tion, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 559, 565-67 (1992) (discussing Rule 5.4 (professional indepen-
dence of a lawyer), Rule 5.5(b) (a lawyer may not assist another in the unauthorized
practice of law), Rule 7.2(c) (a lawyer may not compensate a person for recommending
the lawyer's services), and Rule 7.3 (a lawyer may not solicit, in person or via live tele-
phone contact, prospective clients for pecuniary gain)).
209. For a thorough discussion of the debate and the history of various American Bar
Association proposals, see id. at 579-84.
210. See supra notes 153-54.
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the rules of professional conduct .... ,"I" Rule 1.16(b) permits a lawyer
to withdraw if the "client insists upon pursuing an objective that the law-
yer considers repugnant or imprudent"2"2 or if "the representation will
result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been ren-
dered unreasonably difficult by the client .... "2' 3 A reading of Rule
1.16(b) in its entirety indicates (because of the "or if" language immedi-
ately preceding the numbered subsections) that a lawyer may withdraw
under subsections (3) and (5) even if this would adversely affect her cli-
ent's interests.
This license to get rid of a costly or difficult client may be appropriate
for clients who are reasonably healthy and self-motivated. But an enfee-
bled or questionably competent client may have greater need for legal
assistance yet lack the vigor or focus to pursue it. I have the utmost
sympathy for a lawyer's desire to rid herself of the headache of represent-
ing a questionably competent client with self-destructive or extremely
selfish impulses. But, considering the needs of such a client, I cannot
recommend that the lawyer decline or withdraw from representation.
Such responses irresponsibly deny access to legal services to those who
need them most and typically accomplish nothing other than getting the
lawyer off the hook while possibly passing the problem on to another
lawyer who may also pass the buck, eventually leaving the client without
any lawyer at all. Ironically, however, a literal reading of Rule 1.16(a)
may require withdrawal because attempts to represent clients under Rule
1.14 may, as noted earlier,2 14 entail breaches of mandatory rules concern-
ing loyalty and confidentiality.
The Conference Working Group on Capacity, addressing the issue of
attorney withdrawal, recommended expanding the comment to Rule 1.14
to state that "where capacity comes into question, preference should be
given to staying with the situation and taking protective action over with-
drawal from the case."2 '
Apart from refusal to take the case or withdrawal, once the lawyer
determines her client is either totally incompetent or incompetent within
a given sphere, her major options under the Rules are to either act as de
facto guardian or to seek a partial or total determination of incompetency
via conservatorship or guardianship proceedings. Either option is
fraught with impossible practical and ethical dilemmas, including poten-
tial breaches of the Rules concerning the duties of confidentiality and
loyalty. As Professor Tremblay comments,
[The position of a] lawyer representing an incompetent client without a
guardian... is plainly far more difficult and wrought with internal
contradictions than either the Rule or the Comment is willing to rec-
211. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.16(a)(1).
212. Id Rule 1.16(b)(3).
213. Id Rule 1.16(b)(5).
214. See supra part III.B.3.
215. Report of Working Group , supra note 152, at 1007.
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ognize.... It is in fact a classic moral dilemma-each option available
to the lawyer has conflicting moral considerations. The Rule should
assist in resolving this dilemma, but it fails. The Rule seems to sacri-
fice confidentiality and loyalty, as well as the concomitant "adverse
[e]ffect" on the client's interest, in favor of a principle of benign pater-
nalism without explaining why or when the Rule is triggered.21
The lawyer's most drastic option is to seek the appointment of a guard-
ian for her client, but "only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. ' 217 Comment 3
to Rule 1.14 encourages the lawyer to take this step "where it would
serve the client's best interests., 2 8 Again, the problem of attorney bias
in deciding what is in the client's best interests arises. Even good-faith
resort to the client's lifetime commitments and values may prove illusory
because individuals' values (or, at least, value emphases) change as they
age. A lawyer's natural desire for convenience and protection against
liability also raises concerns about potential breaches of the duty of loy-
alty. Moreover, when a lawyer exercises her discretion to seek appoint-
ment of a guardian, she clearly runs afoul of mandatory rules forbidding
disclosure of confidential information.
The American Bar Association's Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility addressed the confidentiality issue in an Informal
Ethics Opinion.2" 9 The opinion recognized that it would be impossible to
seek the appointment of a guardian without disclosing the facts leading
to suspicion about the client's competency. At a minimum, such facts
would have to be disclosed to the court and to any expert witnesses
needed to aid the court in making its determination. 220 The drafters of
the opinion finessed this problem by concluding that disclosure to a court
or expert witness must be "impliedly authorized" within the meaning of
Rule 1.6 in order to seek appointment of a guardian. 2 ' Considering cli-
ent fears about guardianship and institutionalization, 222 I cannot believe
that this conclusion amounts to anything more than wishful thinking. 223
As Professor Tremblay bluntly observed,
216. Tremblay, supra note 11, at 547 (footnotes omitted).
217. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14(b). When Rule 1.14(b) was first drafted, it
was drafted as an obligation to seek appointment of a guardian. The permissive "may"
language was adopted before the final draft version. See Devine, supra note 54, at 499.
218. Model Rules, supra note 12, Rule 1.14 cmt. 3.




222. See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
223. To clarify this ambiguity in the Model Rules, the Conference Working Group
recommended that the following language be added as Rule 1.14(c):
While it might be necessary to disclose information, the disclosure should be
strictly limited to that which is necessary to accomplish the protective purpose.
Report of Working Group, supra note 152, at 1013. This amendment at least tells the
attorney what she can do rather than forcing her, at great risk, to divine the meaning of
the current delphic rules. But the question remains whether it is good policy, considering
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A lawyer's decision to impose guardianship on a client without his
consent or understanding is particularly difficult to justify given the
lawyer's obligations of loyalty and zeal ..... [V]iewed from its harsh-
est perspective, the process looks like this: the client hires the lawyer
to serve as his loyal agent and confidante; the lawyer promises him that
those expectations are warranted and will be fulfilled; the lawyer then
uses her client's confidences to bring a court proceeding that will de-
prive him of all his rights, and will require him to obtain another law-
yer to defend against it; and all the while the lawyer plans to resume
representing him once this distraction is over. This representation is
obviously chock full of direct ethical violations." 4
Two proposals designed to guide attorneys through this ethical quag-
mire emerged from the Conference Working Group deliberations. One is
a recommended Practice Guideline, suggesting that the guardianship sys-
tem be used only as a last resort.225 The other, entitled "Comments on
Changes," states in relevant part:
2. If the lawyer takes protective action under Model Rule 1.14(b),
the lawyer's action shall be guided by:
a. The wishes and values of the client to the extent known; other-
wise according to the client's best interest.
b. The goal of intruding into client's decision-making autonomy to
the least extent possible.
c. The goal of maximizing client capacities.
d. The goal of maximizing family and social connections and com-
munity resources.
6
An often overlooked issue in the ethics debate is whether---even if the
client's condition theoretically warrants guardianship-the treatment of
wards under guardianship or conservatorship in practice is decent
enough to make guardianship a morally permissible option. In principle,
a "protected person's well-being is the sole modern justification of the
state's power as parens patriae to appoint a guardian or conservator of
that person. 227 Yet, the imposition of guardianship or conservatorship
client fears of triggering questions regarding competency, to authorize even limited dis-
closures without providing safeguards along the lines discussed earlier.
224. Tremblay, supra note 11, at 560-61.
225. The recommended practice guideline states:
The lawyer should refer or petition for guardianship of the client only if there
are no other appropriate alternatives. The lawyer should act as petitioner only if
there is no one else available to act. The use of the guardianship system should
be limited to the greatest extent possible.
Report of Working Group, supra note 152, at 1009-10.
226. Id at 1009.
227. Rein, supra note 39, at 1870. Despite overlapping at times,
[t]he state's police power should be distinguished from its power, as parens pa-
triae, to protect the well-being of individual citizens unable to care for them-
selves. While the police power may be exercised to the detriment of the
individual if a substantial public benefit is to be achieved thereby, the individ-
ual's well-being is the sole justification for the exercise of the state's authority as
parens patriae.
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"often strips away decisionmaking power with little or no corresponding
effort at positive therapy to restore lost capacity or preserve and enhance
remaining capacity. As one probate judge put it: "I don't know where
the wards are, who's caring for them, what they're doing .... ""
Wards are frequently relegated to institutional settings where they suf-
fer from overmedication, physical restraints, and sensory deprivation
for the convenience of the staff and for the sake of minimizing costs.
As one court noted in the context of a civil commitment proceeding,
"[t]o deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory
that the confinement is for humane and therapeutic reasons and then
fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of
due process.",229
Another concern is that guardianships and conservatorships often
serve the convenience and other interests of third parties rather than the
interests of the ward or conservatee. 23 ° For instance, hospitals, adult res-
idential facilities, nursing homes, and other third parties sometimes "re-
sort to conservatorships and committee proceedings primarily as vehicles
for monetary collection of outstanding bills and/or to evict the elderly
and disabled from their facilities." 23'
Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40
Mo. L. Rev. 215, 221 (1975).
228. Rein, supra note 39, at 1871 (citing Abuses, supra note 69, at 14 (citing Fred
Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardianship Systems Often Victimize Their Wards, L.A.
Daily J., Sept. 25, 1987, at 6)).
I have previously examined cases involving the stripping away of decision-making
power.
In one case, guardians of 72 year-old Henry Mclver allowed his return to his
fire-damaged home. Mr. McIver was found two months later, delirious and still
living in the house without edible food, running water, or electricity. In another
case, 85-year-old Florence Peters was declared incompetent when her health
problems overwhelmed her husband's ability to cope. She was institutionalized
without visitation from her husband until her death despite winning back her
civil rights. ... [B]oth Peters' husband and her guardian were unable to attend
her funeral because they were honeymooning together in upstate New York. In
a third case, the guardian-and wife-of 62-year-old Donald cut him on the
face and neck with a broken drinking glass because he refused to go to bed. The
woman had a history of alcohol abuse and emotional problems.
Rein, supra note 39, at 1871-72 n.256 (citations omitted).
229. Horstman, supra note 227, at 268 (quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781,
785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), af'd in part, remanded in part and decision reversed in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)). "Although this was a civil
commitment case, the comment is equally apposite in the context of probate conservator-
ships." Rein, supra note 39, at 1872 n.25.
230. See Winsor C. Schmidt et al., Public Guardianship and the Elderly 12-13 (1981);
George J. Alexander, Who Benefits from Conservatorship?, Trial, May 1977, at 30, 31-32;
see also Horstman, supra note 227, at 221-22 (discussing the possibility that the system
might consider the interest of the general public instead of the interest of the ward).
231. Georgina D. Vassiliou, Another View of Conservatorships, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17,
1990, at 1, 1. Other commentators also have focused on monetary motivations behind
the imposition of guardianships:
Kapp and Bigot identify two basic motives underlying a third-party petition
for guardianship. The first is altruism, "a sincere desire to protect and benefit a
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Relatives of the proposed ward constitute the largest group of third-
party petitioners. These relatives sometimes have difficulty separating
their own interests from those of the proposed ward. Adult children,
for example, may fear that Mom or Grandma is slipping and that her
assets, including the inheritance, are threatened by frivolous purchases,
generous gifts, or mismanagement.2 32
In addition to the more obvious examples of conflicting interests based
on business concerns or inheritance expectancies, 233 one also suspects
that many well-meaning petitioners seek ultimate decisionmaking power
simply because guardianship provides a more convenient vehicle for
helping another than does the more cumbersome procedure of having to
obtain that person's consent every time a helpful action is planned. As
Professor George Alexander put it, "avarice is hardly the only motiva-
tion leading to the imposition of conservatorships or guardianships that
may not be in the ward's interest. Convenience is another and the state is
not the only petitioner seeking it."'2 34
These practices can result in "the imposition of conservatorships on
persons whose disabilities are purely physical."2 3 This can in turn result
in "inappropriate placement into nursing homes or other state institu-
tions where some outside assistance at the residence might have fore-
stalled the need for the eviction. '236
helpless human being." The second is pragmatism; service providers may re-
fuse to undertake the care of a person of questionable competence unless there
is a legally recognized guardian who can give consent for treatment and assure
compensation for services rendered.
Rosoff & Gottlieb, supra note 98, at 15 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
232. Rein, supra note 39, at 1828. For a discussion of cases that arrived at determina-
tions in a circular manner, see supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (describing cases involving
conservatorship).
234. Alexander, supra note 105, at 13. Specific examples given by Professor Alexander
are instructive:
Surrogate management is, however, much more convenient. By obtaining the
right to sign for the ward, state agencies are relieved of many burdensome ap-
provals. Competent persons must consent to many plans devised supposedly
for their benefit. For example, they must consent to treatment, to being moved
to another facility, to giving up rights to sue those who harm them. They must
also acknowledge receipt of appropriate services. If competent, they might, for
example, refuse to acknowledge having received medical treatment if they were
hastily dismissed by the treating state-paid physician. Once the state obtains
the legal right to sign for its patient, however, it can provide the missing consent
and give the withheld acknowledgements [sic]. It can relieve itself of the safe-
guards that are supposed to guarantee proper service.
Id at 12-13.
235. Rein, supra note 39, at 1829.
236. Vassiliou, supra note 231, at 1.
Convalescent homes, for example, often refuse admission to physically impaired
persons unless they are represented by a guardian. Due to the high demand for,
and the low availability of, space in convalescent homes, these homes have been




Once placed under guardianship or conservatorship, a ward may have
scant protection against abuse by his own guardian or conservator, who
is armed with the power to manage or to dispose of the ward's assets. It
is true that some "[s]tatutes, particularly those enacted in the more pro-
gressive states, fairly bristle with so-called safeguards against self-dealing
by guardians and conservators. Accounts, reports, and inventories must
be filed, investigations must be made and court approvals obtained. 237
"[B]ut the typical understaffed and overworked bureaucracy can hardly
keep up with all of these tasks in a meaningful way."'238 There is simply
no guarantee that the fiduciary will not steal or dissipate the property
before anyone catches up with him via accounting or removal proce-
dures. "Most private guardians and conservators lack fiduciary experi-
ence, and some tend 'to act as if the money belonged to them. After all,
they are often the heirs of the ward; they are waiting in the wings and see
no harm in treating the money as if it were already theirs.' "239
Even if the fiduciary is honest and competent,
the ward may receive but scant attention from her guardian, who may
conceive the guardian's role as providing for the ward in a technical
sense rather than providing personal comfort and attention. The prob-
lem is particularly acute in public guardianship cases. Although one
expert recommends that a guardian should not be responsible for more
than [thirty] wards at a time, public guardians may have caseloads of
150 to 200 wards. The average caseload of public conservators in Sac-
ramento County, California, is sixty-five. Even professional guardians
who bill their wards up to [sixty-five] dollars an hour may supervise
300 to 400 cases at any given time.2 °
Rein, supra note 39, at 1829-30. Consider one telling illustration:
People familiar with the practice in San Mateo County describe the following
situation: a person is no longer able to live alone, is unsupervised, has fallen, or
has suffered injuries. A convalescent hospital is the proper placement, but some
convalescent homes refuse to accept such people without a conservatorship.
They want to deal with a representative who has legal authority. Conservator-
ship thus becomes part of the placement process. In some cases, this may reflect
a kind of prejudice (probably unconscious) against the elderly. It is unlikely that
the hospital would think in terms of a conservatorship if the impaired person were
35, or perhaps even 50. A 30-year-old woman in a wheelchair is not seen with the
same eyes as a frail 85-year-old sitting in the same wheelchair.
Friedman & Savage, supra note 81, at 286-87 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). "It is
inappropriate to withdraw decisionmaking powers from persons who are mentally capa-
ble simply because they are too physically injured or impaired to personally execute their
decisions." Rein, supra note 39, at 1829-30 (citing Freidman & Savage, supra note 81, at
283-84).
237. Rein, supra note 39, at 1839. See generally Sally B. Hurme, Steps to Enhance
Guardianship Monitoring (1991) (recommending changes to current legal constraints on
guardians); Penelope A. Hommel et al., Trends in Guardianship Reform: Implications for
the Medical and Legal Professions, 18 Law, Med., & Health Care 213 (1990) (discussing
current monitoring requirements and proposing ten steps to a new monitoring system).
238. Rein, supra note 39, at 1839.
239. Id. at 1839 (quoting Friedman & Savage, supra note 81, at 285-86).
240. Id. at 1881-82 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 621160
BEYOND THE COMPETENCY CONSTRUCT
If a client cannot communicate at all, even after every encouragement
to do so, of course someone must be appointed to make decisions for
him. But if the client is capable of communication and has shown no
desire to have a guardian appointed, I cannot recommend that any law-
yer seek guardianship unless and until guardianship reforms aimed at
providing personalized help for, and real accountability to, the ward be-
come universally effective, not only in the enactment but also in the real
life implementation by caregivers, guardians, judges, and lawyers. Even
then, guardianship should be the choice of last resort after all other op-
tions have been thoroughly explored.241
If the only choices are between acting as defacto guardian or trigger-
ing formal guardianship proceedings against one's client, the former is
the less drastic and more humanly appealing option. But neither option
is satisfactory. "The Model Rules do not define 'de facto' guardianship,
but logically it means that the attorney makes decisions for her client,
much as a guardian would. '242 The Model Rules' concept of de facto
guardianship is potentially broad enough (or, at least, vague enough) to
include authority to make major legal decisions.243
Compared to formal guardianship, de facto guardianship has several
virtues. It permits the lawyer to take immediate action to prevent irrepa-
rable harm that may occur before a formal guardian can be appointed. 2 "
Most importantly, de facto guardianship avoids the traumatization and
public stigmatization produced by formal guardianship proceedings. It is
less intrusive and, at least formalistically, less permanent. It also "deals
with the needs of impoverished seniors for whom guardianship is imprac-
tical, since little money is involved. '24 5
Notwithstanding its practical benefits, defacto guardianship remains a
perilous option for both lawyer and client. As indicated earlier, the rules
do not state any basis, recognized or otherwise, for the representation to
continue without authorization by a competent client.246 This problem
241. In addressing this concern, the Conference Working Group on Capacity proposed
adoption of the following practice guideline:
The lawyer should refer or petition for guardianship of the client only if there
are no other appropriate alternatives. The lawyer should act as petitioner only
if there is no one else available to act. The use of the guardianship system
should be limited to the greatest extent possible.
Report of Working Group, supra note 152, at 1009-10.
242. Tremblay, supra note 11, at 570.
243. See id at 574.
244. See Peter Margulies, Access; Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to
Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1087-88
(1993) (p.39 nn. 60-62 and accompanying text).
When feasible, however, I prefer my "time out" solution for emergency situations be-
cause this gives the client himself time to calm down and, perhaps, make a better decision
after counseling and further reflection. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
245. Margulies, supra note 244, at 41. For a good summary of the benefits of defacto
guardianship, see Tremblay, supra note 11, at 571-72. Note that Professor Tremblay
ultimately rejects de facto guardianship as a responsible option.
246. See discussion supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
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might be minimized if the rules did not focus so exclusively on the com-
petency question, as if competence were some reified thing that the client
either is or is not within a given sphere. Alternately, Rule 1.14 could
explicitly state a different theory-be it an expanded notion of the law-
yer's obligations as officer of the court or treating the situation as the
client-for the lawyer's authority to act.247 But the lack of enforceable
safeguards to protect the client's legitimate autonomy interests within the
privacy of the attorney-client relationship would remain a problem. To
be sure, most lawyers would act in good faith. But a well-meaning attor-
ney can easily fail to recognize her own biases and conflicting interests,
especially when she believes she is "helping" her client. As Professor
Tremblay notes, there is a "tendency, especially of lawyers, to be pater-
nalistic in dealing with less 'capable' persons. '241 Some lawyers are very
respectful of a challenged client's choices-even if they differ from what
the lawyer would choose. Others are not. There is no reliable way of
knowing what goes on within the privacy of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Ensuring accountability, predictability and uniformity of treatment
under these circumstances seems impossible. Some might object that the
client can always discharge his lawyer. But Comment 6 to Rule 1.16
observes that "[i]f the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack
the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer . . . ." De facto guardianship
might, therefore, turn out to be as permanent and irreversible as many
formal guardianships.
In the final analysis, deciding between defacto guardianship in its pres-
ent unrestricted form and formal guardianship is like choosing between
Scylla and Charybdis. 24 9 Therefore, I suggest new directions and mecha-
nisms for avoiding the harm threatened by self-destructive or socially
destructive client impulses.
IV. BEYOND THE COMPETENCY CONSTRUCT
[Any process or form of representation must take account of both the
individual and his or her ongoing relationships within a family and a
community. 2
50
The overarching goal of this Article has been to direct our efforts away
from finding people incompetent when moral and societal dilemmas arise
and toward finding other solutions, while still offering real help. No mat-
ter how it is phrased or how it is sugar-coated, a determination of incom-
247. See Report of Working Group, supra note 152, at 1011-13.
248. Tremblay, supra note 11, at 576.
249. A Conference Working Group proposal entitled "Comments on Changes" seeks
to restrict the scope of de facto guardianship by admonishing that:
If the lawyer decides to act as de facto guardian, he or she, when appropriate,
should seek to discontinue acting as such as soon as possible and to implement
other protective solutions.
Report of Working Group, supra note 152, at 1009.
250. Watson, supra note 118, at 864.
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petency-even within a limited sphere-is the ultimate denial of
autonomy and personal dignity. Once appointed, the guardian or de
facto guardian, acting within her sphere of power, can do and consent to
all sorts of things in her ward's name. Even if applicable law requires
consultation, the surrogate decision-maker can still override the ward's
wishes if she finds them unfeasible or "unreasonable." '251
My search is for solutions that do not require a finding of incompe-
tency for their implementation. Such solutions leave the individual, even
if interfered with on a particular occasion, with his rights still intact and
with the ability to come back and fight another day if need be. This
approach encourages more personal and higher quality care for our el-
ders because individuals who are not declawed by incompetency determi-
nations can demand greater solicitude and accountability from those who
are supposed to be helping them.
This phase of the discussion invites those who struggle with the intrac-
table issues explored so far to consider a different focus and approach,
exploring possible ways to resolve moral and societal dilemmas without
questioning the client's competency or interfering with his autonomy any
more than we would or should interfere with the autonomy of a compe-
tent adult who made the identical decision. This inquiry revolves around
two distinct but overlapping issues:
1. When is it appropriate, from a social policy viewpoint, to interfere
with individual decisions and activities even if the decisionmaker is com-
petent or minimally competent? What factors should we consider in de-
ciding where to draw the line?
2. Can we develop mechanisms that do not require a finding of in-
competency for their implementation but nevertheless mitigate or elimi-
nate the harmful effects of a client's destructive choices without
impairing the essence of his autonomy?
Our exclusive use of the competency construct to determine when and
how to interfere with individual choice has prevented us from developing
guidelines for interference that are based on social policy considerations.
This exclusive focus has also deterred us from developing more discrimi-
nating and less intrusive mechanisms for dealing with destructive and
antisocial choices.252 Thus, in venturing beyond the competency con-
251. Fla. Stat. § 744.3215 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) states, for example, that
[a] person who has been determined to be incapacitated retains the right... [t]o
remain as independent as possible, including having his preference as to place
and standard of living honored, either as he expressed or demonstrated his pref-
erence prior to the determination of his incapacity or as he currently expresses
his preference, insofar as such request is reasonable.
Id (emphasis added).
252. Some reforms aim to make interventions less intrusive in a mechanical sense. But
my premise here is that telling someone he or she is incompetent and cannot make certain
decisions within a given sphere is the most intrusive thing-short of inflicting serious
bodily injury-that one person can do to another. As I stated elsewhere,
[o]ne of the major substantive reforms has been the requirement that the court
1994] 1163
1164 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
struct, I find very little direct precedent to work with. Although some
suggestions are an easy extension of existing precedent, others may ap-
pear to be made out of whole cloth. The discussion that follows assumes
that client counseling has not produced the desired result.
A. General Guidelines for Interference Versus Noninterference
Notwithstanding some ambivalence about specific proposals, I offer
the following guidelines for determing when society's interest in honor-
ing the decisions of adults, competent or not, is outweighed by other vital
societal interests. My starting premise is that interference with individ-
ual decisionmaking is warranted only to protect third party or societal
interests when, in the particular situation, they are of higher social im-
portance than untrammeled decision-making itself. In saying this, I am
the first to acknowledge that in any weighing process, society's interest in
allowing individuals to make their own decisions is, in and of itself, enti-
tled to enormous weight. As a general proposition, individual autonomy
is its own virtue.
2 53
An additional and more concrete reason for respecting the wishes of
our elders lies in the findings of psychiatrists, gerontologists, psycholo-
gists, and environmental psychologists to the effect that "the mental
health of many elderly individuals deteriorates greatly when they are de-
nied the opportunity to make their own choices and [to] exert control
over their own lives."'254
authorize only the least restrictive alternative in sanctioning various kinds of
intervention .....
Although the least-restrictive-alternative approach seems facially reasonable
... it is fundamentally flawed. One problem is that the least restrictive alterna-
tive requirement does not ... insist that the intervenor better the [challenged
individual's] situation by taking positive steps to improve [his] health, restore or
enhance [his] mental powers, make [him] subjectively happier, or at least pre-
vent further emotional deterioration. The least restrictive alternative may sim-
ply be the least restrictive of several existing choices, all of which may well be
miserable and dehumanizing. Moreover, like the "best interests" model, what
constitutes the least restrictive alternative can be determined by reference to the
values of the decisionmaker or the so-called reasonable person rather than the
subjective needs and values of the [challenged individual].
Rein, supra note 39, at 1882-83.
253. As one judge observed,
The fact that someone else might, or could make better choices is not the point.
In a constitutional system such as ours which prizes and protects individual
liberties to make decisions, even bad ones, the right to make those decisions
must be preserved. ...
The integrity of the elderly, no less than any other group of our citizens,
should not be invaded, nor their freedom of choice taken from them by the state
simply because we believe that decisions could be "better" made by someone
else.
In re Fischer, 552 N.Y.S.2d 807 at 813 n.17, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
254. Rein, supra note 39, at 1836. Loss of control can produce serious depression. See
Brickner, supra note 56, at 193. Even rats decompensate when they lose control of a
situation. See supra note 56.
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Having acknowledged that one of our most cherished policies is that of
preserving individual autonomy, I cannot blind myself to the fact that
there are many other policy concerns of high magnitude in our galaxy of
ideals. Were this not so, there would be no such thing as land use regula-
tion, regulation of business practices, smoking bans in public areas, hel-
met laws, safety regulations, insurance requirements, and a host of other
limitations on personal autonomy. Moreover, as resources become more
scarce and our society more interdependent, policies promoting coopera-
tion with and concern for others are assuming increasing importance by
sheer necessity. This assortment of policies might be viewed as subparts
of a broad policy of ensuring the health and very survival of our society.
To say that this is a policy of the highest magnitude understates the
obvious.
In deciding whether or not societal interference vith a client's decision
(regardless of competence) is warranted, the central inquiry should be
whether or not the proposed decision is seriously unfair or detrimental to
other individuals or society at large. Factors to consider include:
1. Does the client's chosen course of action threaten serious bodily
injury to others?
If so, interference of some sort is probably warranted.
2. Will it seriously invade the rights, health, resources, and welfare
of others?
Society has an interest in protecting the rights and well-being of its mem-
bers. Therefore, protecting individuals against invasion of their rights
and resources is, in and of itself, an important societal interest. Here, we
must distinguish between client actions that merely withhold a benefit
(e.g., an inheritance or gift) and actions that affirmatively invade an-
other's rights and resources by demanding that they confer a benefit or
accept a detriment as the price exacted to accommodate the actor's un-
trammeled autonomy. Actions that merely withhold a benefit do not
warrant intervention on an individual basis unless, perhaps, they usurp
some equitable ownership claim in the heir apparent. Even then, lifetime
intervention is usually unnecessary because the surviving equitable owner
or his estate can often assert a claim to part of the willmaker's estate.
Moreover, society can seek improvement of forced share and family
maintenance concepts by developing more sophisticated measures of gen-
eral application aimed at protecting the legitimate needs and expectations
of certain survivors.
3. Will those whose interests will be adversely affected learn about
the threat in time to take self protective action?
If so, interference is probably unnecessary (although it may be desirable),
at least when threatened third parties have the resources to protect their
interests. If not, it may be necessary to at least alert those potentially
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affected to the threatened action. 255
4. Is the harm threatened by the client's action irreparable or ex-
tremely difficult to reverse?
As the risk of irreversibility increases, so does the case for interference
with the client's decision.
5. Even if the threatened harm in a given case is relatively insub-
stantial, will similar decisions in the aggregate place such a serious
strain on the public treasury that resources for important public needs
will become unavailable?
The existence of this factor may not, in itself, warrant interference, but if
there are other factors that suggest a need for action, this factor may tip
the scales in favor of intervention.
By listing these factors, I do not suggest that intervention is warranted
every time a client plans something that is distasteful or detrimental to
other individuals or to society in general. Each case must be judged on
its specific facts.
In the assessment process, a countervailing consideration of enormous
importance is how integral the decision in question is to the client's most
intimate life and values. The closer the decision is to the client's heart
and privacy, the less we should be willing to interfere with it even if the
client's decision imposes some hardship and consternation on others.
Decisions about living arrangements and choice of friends should be the
client's to make. Decisions of this nature require special caution and
restraint by those who are tempted to interfere. Consider the following
examples.
An elderly person may, like many younger individuals,
choose to gamble or to spend money in ways others deem frivolous.
He or she may choose to buy companionship by lavishing funds on a
companion whose friendship is motivated by avarice. Such practices
should not provide grounds for intervention [unless the rights and re-
sources of others are seriously invaded as a result]. However frivolous
the expenditures or distasteful the motives of the companion, the indi-
vidual may derive a great deal of pleasure[, support, and care] from the
arrangement.256
In such cases, there should be an extremely strong presumption against
interference.
On the other hand, one cannot "ignore the reality that unscrupulous
business organizations and individuals sometimes prey on trusting el-
ders-particularly those with poor eyesight or impaired hearing-by em-
ploying fraud, misrepresentation, and half-truths to relieve them of their
money without offering corresponding gratification. ' 257 As Dr. Kapp
255. This could not be done without authorizing, in special circumstances, some de-
parture from the current rules regarding confidentiality.
256. Rein, supra note 39, at 1874.
257. Id. at 1874.
1166 [Vol. 62
BEYOND THE COMPETENCY CONSTRUCT
put it, "The older person's right to choose should not be confused with
'the right to be ripped off.' "258 Business organizations and strangers
who prey on vulnerable individuals are not close to the heart or intimate
life of their victims. Intervention to prevent such strangers from profit-
ing from their dishonest tactics seems more supportable than interven-
tion that deprives the client of companionship even when the companion
is no angel.
Although it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to devise an ap-
proach that will distinguish in every situation between expenditures
that bring substantive gratification-which should be allowed without
interference-and expenditures that merely fleece the individual of his
property with little of no compensatory benefit, the effort should be
made.259
Taking another example, suppose that a client who has a tendency to
fall or to wander prefers to remain at home unattended, notwithstanding
the risk of a harmful or fatal accident, rather than to submit to the lack
of privacy and stripping of individuality that occurs upon entering an
institution. His lawyer should make every effort to ensure that this wish
remains a reality even if the client's family suffers anxiety and inconven-
258. Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Empowerment of the Elderly, Hastings Center Rep.,
July-Aug. 1989, at 5.
259. Rein, supra note 39, at 1874. As I further explained,
[m]y approach is to limit intervention to situations calling for the protection of
vital societal interests and even then, by regulating the unscrupulous third party
rather than by placing the individual under guardianship or conservatorship.
If, for example, a sales organization, insurance salesperson, or other stranger
extracted money or property by criminal, tortious, or highly unscrupulous
means, a court might appoint a guardian ad litem for the sole purpose of seek-
ing rescission of the transaction or bringing a civil action in tort. Because a
companion-even one motivated by greed-generally provides pleasure, similar
regulation of an elder's companion should be limited to situations in which the
companion employs imprisonment, physical abuse, or blatant and objectively
verifiable fraud or mental abuse to gain control of the individual's assets. In
neither instance should the statute authorize the court to appoint a general
guardian or conservator. Instead, the statute should clearly limit the court's
authority to the appointment of a special guardian ad litem and even then, only
if the facts of the case demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a vital
societal interest-i.e., the deterrence of unjust enrichment through criminal or
tortious activity-justifies intervention over the so-called protected person's ex-
pressed wishes or objections.
aId at 1874-75.
Currently the request for a guardian ad litem suggests some kind of mental disability if
the client is an adult. Thus, "raising the question of disability could, in some circum-
stances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment." Model Rules, supra note 12,
Rule 1.14 cmt. 5. Changes in evidentiary and procedural rules might be needed for this
approach to work without raising questions regarding the client's competency. Proce-
dural rules might, for example, allow the appointment of a special "agent" for reasons
other than mental disability, and evidentiary rules might preclude use of the appointment
as evidence of incompetency in any proceeding to determine competency. See Rein,
supra note 39, at 1874.
I now prefer my injunctive relief approach, see infra text after note 279, to the guardian
ad litem approach discussed above.
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ience as a result. In either of these the types of cases, the client's very
personal interests may very well outweigh admittedly important third-
party and societal interests.
The primary focus so far has been on client decisions that threaten
important rights and interests of other individuals. The most difficult
cases, both morally and analytically, are those in which the client's deci-
sion does not threaten harm to any particular individual other than him-
self. Hypothetical 22" concerning Martha and the unscrupulous roofer
or real estate speculator falls into this category of cases. Nevertheless,
although this is an admittedly slippery slope (albeit less slippery than
using incompetency to justify interference), it can be argued that
Martha's choice should be interfered with in some manner, not because
Martha is incompetent to make the decision, but because decisions like
hers, in the aggregate, put additional burdens on society's already scarce
resources and are otherwise harmful to the social fabric by encouraging
the continuance of unscrupulous behavior. It is also arguable that
preventing a "rip off" of Martha's house actually preserves her autonomy
by preserving the resources needed for her to exercise her autonomy.
The factor of irrevocability of the harm also comes into play in this hypo-
thetical. Suggestions for dealing with the threatened "rip off" of
Martha's house will be made in the following subsection on solutions. 26I
Ultimately, the supportability of interference when personal harm di-
rectly affects only the client will depend on the facts of each case and the
nature of each decision. Were Martha's decision to continue to live with
an abusive child for purely personal reasons, interference would probably
not be warranted.
The foregoing suggestions and guidelines should not be taken as im-
mutable conclusions of universal applicability. Decisions to interfere or
not cannot be made in the abstract. They must, as noted, be made within
the context of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Such
judgments will also depend on the moral decency and utility of the op-
tions available in any given case. This brings us to our second task of
developing a repertoire of devices for dealing with destructive and antiso-
cial client choices that do not depend on a finding of incompetency or
incapacity for their implementation.
B. A Search for Solutions that Are Less Destructive of the
Human Spirit
As noted earlier, 6 ' findings of incompetency or incapacity are pro-
foundly depressing to the individuals so labelled. This search for alterna-
tives proceeds on the assumption that using an incompetency finding to
avoid a bad result is like, if the reader will excuse the hyperbole, using a
260. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
261. See infra text accompanying note 280. Regarding the point that intervention
sometimes preserves autonomy, see my discussion of Professor Tremblay, supra note 56.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 196-205.
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small nuclear device to destroy a dangerous building. In terms of pre-
serving the human spirit, the best solutions bring practical help to the
client in ways that solve the problem, thus obviating the need for any
determination of incompetency.
In apparent concurrence, the Working Group recommended as a prac-
tice guideline that "the use of the guardianship system should be limited
to the greatest extent possible" and by listing "protective actions" that do
not involve the guardianship system.263 Although there is some overlap,
existing solutions that do not require formal determinations of incompe-
tency may be roughly divided into two categories: 1) planning options
and 2) community services to facilitate independent living in the
community.
Planning options include planning for post-capacity property manage-
ment and for post-capacity health care decision-making. The latter in-
clude so-called living wills and durable powers of attorney for health care
decisions. The major devices for post-capacity property management are
revocable living trusts and durable powers of attorney for property man-
agement. The advantages of these devices are that they allow the trustee
or successor trustee of the trust or agent under the durable power of
attorney to step in for the beneficial owner upon a nonformal, private
finding of incapacity in accordance with procedures dictated by the bene-
ficial owner while he was competent. This avoids the trauma and stigma-
tization of formal guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and also
enables the beneficial owner to designate who should act for him. As an
alternative to these planning devices, the Uniform Custodial Trust
Act,264 where enacted, would "facilitate the use of a statutory trust for
the management of property for the support of adult persons, most likely
263. Report of Working Group, supra note 152, at 1010. This list included:
1. Involve family members;
2. Use of durable power of attorney;
3. Use of revocable trusts;
4. Use of a "time out" to allow cooling off, clarification, improvement of
circumstances;
5. Referral to private case management;
6. Referral to long-term care ombudsman;
7. Use of church or other care and support systems;
8. Referral to disability support groups;
9. Referral to social services or other governmental agencies, such as con-
sumer protection agencies. The lawyer should weigh the appropriateness
and risk of agency referrals.
Id. In the litigation context, nonguardianship options included:
1. File for injunctive relief;
2. Request for appointment of a guardian ad litem;
3. File for continuance;
4. File petition for a protective order, or limited or plenary guardianship;
5. Invoke regulatory or administrative remedies, for example, file a separate
consumer protection complaint).
Id.
264. 7A U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 1993).
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elderly persons fearing incapacity., 265
These planning devices may be the best options currently available and
may work tolerably well if the chosen agent or trustee turns out to be
trustworthy. But abuse and outright theft by fiduciaries, armed with
documents authorizing them to take any action the principal or trustor
could personally, is widespread. As I said in an earlier article,
Probate court officials, social workers, and others who work with the
elderly have expressed growing concern that the durable power of at-
torney and other private management devices are increasingly em-
ployed as the least restrictive alternative. They argue that these...
alternatives leave the frail elderly defenseless and actually invite abuse
without any guarantee of compensating benefit. These objections have
some merit. Although law enforcement officials, concerned private cit-
izens, ombudsmen, and other officials seek redress against faithless fi-
duciaries when cases of abuse come to their attention, many instances
of fiduciary abuse go unnoticed. Also, the fiduciary may squander the
assets before anyone, including the settlor or principal, notices. Our
currently available options provide no easy solution to the dilemma
that, though guardianship and conservatorship may be too instrusive,
the least restrictive alternative approach may leave our senior citizens
without reliable assistance. As one of my colleagues on an elderlaw
advisory panel quipped in discussing guardianships and conservator-
ships versus durable powers of attorney: "One is a license to kill, the
other a license to steal." A program or referral service offering
prescreened, trained and bonded agents might answer the need for reli-
able and competent assistance short of guardianship or
conservatorship. 2 66
Regarding community services to promote independent living, many
lawyers, myself included, are unaware of all the services their communi-
ties offer to help senior citizens live independently. Their practices are
not set up to orchestrate these services for their client. But if they were, a
social worker or community counselor might be able to obtain the cli-
ent's trust and voluntary acceptance of a host of services including home-
maker/home health care services, transportation, shopping, billpayer
services, "congregate and home delivered meals, senior centers, case
management, day care facilities," and financial management services.267
Such a combination of services might enable the client "to care for self
and property and thus relieve the need for an incapacity determination"
or institutionalization. 26' This community services approach might work
well for the client who would prefer to remain home, notwithstanding
the risk of falling down and incurring injury. For the client who tends to
wander, a combination of community-based services and use of a track-
265. James R. Wade, The Uniform Custodial Trust Act, Prob. & Prop., Nov.-Dec.
1987, at 37, 37.
266. Rein, supra note 39, at 1884-85 (footnotes omitted).
267. Anderer, supra note 13, at 47 n.133.
268. Id.
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ing device enabling relatives or authorities to track his movements might
obviate the need for more serious intervention. Other options providing
practical help are the suggestions made earlier about authorizing mul-
tidisciplinary practices269 and making lawyer-diagnostician cooperation
possible while providing safeguards against use of the information gained
in formal guardianship proceedings.27 0
The next best solutions would be those that rely on outside agencies to
mitigate the adverse effects of an antisocial decision without overriding it
or enlisting the decision-maker's cooperation at all. It would be ideal, for
example, if Martha's lawyer in Hypothetical 2 could persuade the public
prosecutor or attorney general to take action against the unscrupulous
roofer or land speculator to enjoin them from pursuing Martha and other
victims of their fraud. But given the scarcity of, and competition for,
public resources, the availability of this option does not appear imminent.
Although community-based services might solve many problems,
there will be times when more specific interventions are needed. Because
these cannot be developed in the abstract, the following suggestions are
made within the context of the three hypotheticals used to introduce the
themes of this Article.
1. Hypothetical 17
Assume that the lawyer has succeeded in obtaining the release of Ar-
nold's car. If Arnold continues to drive, notwithstanding his untreated
seizures, his negligent, even willful, conduct threatens at any time to in-
flict death or serious bodily injury on unsuspecting members of the pub-
lic. Since no one knows about Arnold's condition except Arnold and his
lawyer, if the lawyer, bound by her duty of confidentiality, notifies no
one, someone will likely be killed or maimed. Competent or not, Arnold
should be stopped, but having Arnold determined incompetent seems an
unnecessary and ineffectual way to go about stopping him.
Here, the lawyer would be justified in notifying public authorities so
that they might revoke Arnold's driver's license and disable the car until
Arnold accepts treatment. Current confidentiality rules would not per-
mit Arnold's lawyer to notify others. But Model Rule 1.6(b) already
permits a lawyer to disclose information if necessary "to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a criminal act that... is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm." Expansion of Rule 1.6(b) to include
an exception permitting disclosure in cases like Hypothetical I would not
constitute a great extension of existing precedent. Deciding what condi-
tions warrant disclosure requires caution. For example, an individual
infected with the AIDS virus may fatally injure others with whom he has
sexual relations. Yet disclosure of infectious conditions like AIDS is un-
269. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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derstandably forbidden because fear of disclosure would deter infected
individuals from seeking treatment, thus spreading the disease even fur-
ther. In any event, to the extent disclosure is authorized, informed con-
sent principles and basic fairness would require that the lawyer inform
prospective clients of any limitations on her duty of confidentiality.
2. Hypothetical 2272
Either a collection company representing the unscrupulous roofer or
the unscrupulous real estate speculator closes in on Martha and her
house with its fraudulently acquired deed in hand. The answer is due but
Martha, for rational or irrational reasons, decides not to fight in court
and refuses to sign the answer and complaint.
The lawyer's first response should be, if procedural rules permit, to get
"time out" to assess the situation and to try to reason with Martha. If
gradual counseling and gentle persuasion fail to convince Martha and it
appears that she will lose her home unless something is done, interven-
tion will be needed to save the house. But what kind of intervention is
called for? My approach would be to interfere with the unscrupulous
victimizers rather than the victim.
This approach utilizes my concept of the "predator donee" and
"predator recipient." A large number of competency determinations are
sought because the person whose competency is questioned has been vic-
timized and cheated out of his assets by predator donees and other
predator recipients. Thus, we seem to proceed against the victim rather
than the victimizer. But interference with the predator is morally prefer-
able because the predator is the one who, with premeditation, used un-
scrupulous, sometimes vicious, tactics to prey on competent but trusting
and vulnerable individuals.
A 1985 case, ENS et al. v. LDS,2 73 provides an interesting example.
The brothers and sisters of L.D.S. (apparently a relative of a wealthy
family) petitioned the court to "adjudge him an incompetent and to ap-
point a guardian of his estate"2 74 worth approximately $1.5 million. The
fact that L.D.S. had, "within a period of less than two months," without
much expectation of repayment, lent the Lyndon LaRouche organization
$212,000 and planned to lend it another $75,000 triggered the petition. 275
The court's first step after the filing of the petition was to enjoin the
planned additional $75,000 transfer. But the court went further and ad-
judicated L.D.S. an incompetent under a statute that defined an "incom-
petent" as "'a person who, because of infirmities of old age, mental
illness, mental deficiency or retardation, drug addiction or inebriety: (1)
is unable to manage his property or is liable to dissipate it or become the
272. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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victim of designing persons . . ,276
The court saw the issue as whether L.D.S. was "likely to dissipate his
estate or become the victim of designing persons because of a "mental
illness. '2 7 7 Expert witnesses testified that L.D.S. had a "mixed personal-
ity disorder with inadequate and immature features" and that he was
afflicted with "a schizoaffective disorder," which "made him liable to be-
come the victim of designing persons. ' 2 7' The court's own assessment
was that
he has a disorganized mind and compensates by setting up an oversim-
plified view of the world in which he is one of the good guys and
"they" are conspirators bent on mischief. As such he would be and
has been an easy target for anyone who pretends to support him in his
efforts to combat the bad guys. 279
This evaluation could describe many ordinary citizens! Nevertheless, the
court adjudged him incompetent to manage his affairs.
A better approach would have been to enjoin the LaRouche organiza-
tion from receiving L.D.S.'s funds, presently or in the future, without
prior court approval and to notify all affected banking organizations of
the permanent injunction. The court did not discuss the LaRouche or-
ganization's tactics in obtaining L.D.S.'s allegiance and donative sus-
ceptability. But that organization has been accused of deceptive and
otherwise unsavory tactics.28° Assuming that the LaRouche organiza-
tion employed unfair tactics to obtain the gift-like loans, the basis for
injunctive relief should not be L.D.S.'s incompetence or even the
LaRouche organization's beliefs. It should be the brainwashing tech-
niques and coercive tactics of the organization, the predator donee, itself.
This approach should solve the problem in cases in which the troub-
ling transaction is a one-shot deal (as in the case of Martha in Hypotheti-
cal 2) or in which the transferor seems to be addicted to only one donee
or recipient, as in the case of L.D.S. The advantage of this approach is
that it avoids disarming the victim via a determination of incompetency.
This leaves the victim transferor free to manage his property and to deal
freely with and assert the right to decide vis-a-vis anyone in the world
except the predator donee or recipient. I therefore recommend that our
professional conduct, substantive, and procedural rules be modified to
authorize attorneys representing victim transferors to bring "emergency"
proceedings to enjoin predator donees without questioning their clients'
competency.
Returning to Hypothetical 2 and Martha, if intervention is warranted
notwithstanding Martha's stated wishes, injunctive relief against the
276. Id. at 2 (quoting 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5501(1)).
277. Id. at 2.
278. I i
279. Id.
280. For a recent book on the LaRouche organization, see Dennis King, Lyndon
LaRouche and the New American Fascism (1989).
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predator roofer or land speculator seems far preferable to treating
Martha as incompetent to manage her affairs. Martha would remain in
control of her life and free to withold consent vis-a-vis anyone or any
plan of action in the world except the action to restrain her victimizer
from "ripping off" her house. Such actions in the aggregate would dis-
courage the unscrupulous from preying on vulnerable individuals be-
cause the unscrupulous would have less assurance of profiting from their
misdeeds. Thus, a social policy of deterring victimizers would be served.
To be sure, a rule authorizing attorneys to seek injunctive relief without
their client's consent would present practical problems. It may, for ex-
ample, be difficult in some cases for a lawyer to make a case for injunc-
tive relief without her client's cooperation. But information about the
victimizer that is a matter of public record together with documentary
evidence of unfair tactics might suffice in many cases. The rules might
also authorize attorneys to report such incidents to the attorney general,
the public prosecutor, the better business bureau, the agency that li-
censed the predator, and any other consumer organization whose inter-
vention might prove useful.
3. Hypothetical 3281
If Paul goes through with his plan to donate a substantial portion of
his assets to a television evangelist or to a religious cult, he may strip
himself of the resources necessary for his continuing support and may
even eventually lose his house. Since Paul is retired, his chances of re-
couping the loss of resources through gainful employment are slim. Thus
the threat of irrevocable loss is present as a factor.
Depending on the tactics used to trigger Paul's donative impulses,
seeking injunctive relief against the television evangelist or religious cult
might be an option. Suppose, however, that this option is not available.
Here Paul's proposed donation will hurt not only himself and society at
large but his son's family as well. If Paul impoverishes himself, his son
Jake may be morally or even legally bound in some situations to support
him at the expense of his own family's economic well-being and his col-
lege aged childrens' educational opportunities. Thus, Paul's proposed
exercise of autonomy in this case harms not only Paul but also demands
a benefit from Paul's unsuspecting family in a way that imposes serious
harm on them. If the lawyer says and does nothing to prevent the dona-
tion (recall that we ruled out a determination of incompetency), Jake and
his family will be irreparably harmed before they have a chance to talk
Paul out of it or to take other action to protect their interests. Consider-
ing the alternatives, a relaxation of the confidentiality rules to permit the
lawyer to alert Paul's family of his plan might be appropriate. But since,
under our present system, Jake's only option would be to institute con-
servatorship proceedings if he could not dissuade his father from his don-
281. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
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ative plan, some other mechanism for resolution of the dispute should be
provided.
One approach might be to make transfers that impoverish the donor at
the expense of his relatives or the community voidable at the option of
the adversely affected individual or entity. The closest analogy here
would be to the law of fraudulent transfers. 2 ' Another possibility might
be to provide for mandatory mediation in such cases. Since mediation
has worked well in other contexts, it may work here as well. The client
and his family would, through this mechanism, be brought into contact
with professionals who are specifically trained to gain the trust and coop-
eration of all parties concerned. A workable compromise, for example,
might be to make the donation testamentary. Acts of cooperation and
compromise are not dehumanizing. They are the acts of responsible
human beings. In fact, individuals may be in their most human state
when they are engaged in the process of negotiating with others. Negoti-
ation and mediation promote connection and responsible action. The
rules governing lawyers' behavior and the options provided them in rep-
resenting their clients should be designed to promote the values of con-
nection and cooperation. To deny the importance of these values by
failing to provide rules and options that promote them is to deny the
reality of the connectedness and interdependency of all human beings.3
CONCLUSION
The notion of untrammeled individual choice- provided the individ-
ual is mentally and functionally competent-may have been affordable
when this nation still had a frontier, was primarily agricultural, relatively
underpopulated, and socioeconomically less complex. But it is arguably
unworkable, unaffordable, and unfair to the American community under
modern demographic and socioeconomic conditions. Unspokenly, per-
haps unconsciously, realizing the undesirability of untrammeled, perhaps
irresponsible, individual choice under modern conditions, decision mak-
ers tend to interfere with destructive and socially harmful choices when-
ever they can find some basis to do so. Concepts like undue influence,
testamentary capacity, and competency thus become covert but powerful
weapons of social control. Hence, determinations of incompetency as a
basis for interference with individual decisions regarding health care and
activities of daily living are often more a product of social policy than of
282. Although time does not permit here, the full ramifications of such an expansion of
the fraudulent conveyance doctrine should be carefully considered before such a step is
undertaken. The voidable transfer concept, for example, should not be used in the Medi-
caid eligibility context because such a piecemeal addition would only further complicate a
body of law which is already too confusing and complex.
283. See generally Stephen Ellman, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo.
L.J. 2665, 2668 (1993) (arguing that care "emphasizes people's mutual connections rather
than their solitary autonomy").
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objective assessment of decisional capacity or desire to help the
individual.
This Article's overarching goal has been to inject a note of candor by
shifting the focus of the debate from the question of client competency to
the question of good social policy. In urging a new approach, I have
tried to make my ideas concrete by suggesting solutions that combine
good policy with practicality. These suggestions are by no means perfect.
Some were made with great ambivalence and represent uneasy com-
promises between competing moral claims. Yet, they may prove fruitful
by encouraging others to refine them and to develop new and better solu-
tions beyond the competency construct.
